The non-representational approaches deny this very model of perception. In these views, there is no "assembled perception" and hence no need to record it.

The common, traditional (representational) view of vision may go something like this: Although I think I see objects around me, all I really know for sure is that I am having a conscious experience of there being objects. Science tells us that the world is really a colorless cloud of atoms, but I see the world in vivid color. Consciousness, then, must be a creation of my brain. It creates these phenomena, qualia, appearances, or representations as philosophers call them. Because I perceive only representations, any reality or noumemon that may ultimately be behind them must necessarily remain unknown.

Experiences we take as visual failure like misreading a word, optical illusions, and so on are explained by the brain creating the wrong representation or creating a representation that fools us.

Non-representational approaches don't consider perception as a thing, and certainly not a thing created or assembled by the brain. Remember one of the earlier quotes: Perception is an achievement of the individual and not an experience the theater of consciousness.

Take a look at the abstract on the first page:

A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness (PDF)

In the 1960's, psychologist JJ Gibson proposed studying perception from an ecological viewpoint. He suggested studying visual perception in terms of the ambient optic array, that is, the patterned radiation that converges on your position as well as how it changes as you move about (optical texture flow). He thought that most if not all of what we think is created in the head actually exists in the environment as higher-order information that animals can detect and take advantage of.

Here is an excerpt from his book. You can glance at the pictures and the captions to get a sense of his interests:

The Causes of Deficient Perception

The abstract I referenced earlier points out that positing representations still leaves visual consciousness unexplained. Non-representational approaches are attempts to step up and supply an explanation.
The idea is that we attribute the composition to the person. However, when people think about it in a "how was it done?" way they don't want to believe that a person--a body--can do such things. Indeed, the accomplishment is remarkable and perhaps beyond our ability to explain. So over the course of history people have attributed the actual act of composition to something hidden from view, be it an inner spirit, a gift of the Muses, the mind, or in the modern incarnation of the same epistemology: the brain or neurons in the brain. It's the dualism that is in question.

I think there is a justified fear of attributing the act of composition to a mere machine (which the body may seem to us at times). Gilbert Ryle showed the premise to be misguided. He wrote in The Concept of Mind: "Man need not be degraded to a machine by being denied to be a ghost in a machine. He might, after all, be a sort of animal, namely, a higher mammal. There has yet to be ventured the hazardous leap to the hypothesis that perhaps he is a man."

True, but representations don't add any information. They are sometimes charged with being virtus dormitiva explanations after a play by Moliere in which a character explains why opium puts people to sleep: because it has a sleep-causing power.

Non-representational approaches examine the possibility that the brain does not need to create a copy of the world, that the world can stay where it is and serve as its own copy that you explore with greater or lesser degrees of success.

Oh, I dunno, Freudian psychology?