I respectfully disagree:

The more stripped down version of two empirically equivalent theories is not necessarily preferable. Consider a grand master-level chess-playing computer. Your job is to predict its next move. One can treat it as a black box and predict its moves based on chess strategy, or one can take it apart and attempt to reverse engineer its circuitry and decompile the software. The preferable approach depends on one's purposes. But taking the former approach does not prove that there is no rich inner life taking place inside the box.

There is an analogous situation in evolutionary theory: gene centered selection theories are basically empirically equivalent to selection theories that emphasize hierarchical selection involving individual organisms and groups of organisms. But the gene selection theories treat organisms and groups as black boxes and are (rightly, in my view) derided as mere "bookkeeping" models that don't capture the full richness of what is actually going on in nature.

Similarly, before much progress in neurology was possible, behaviorism of the B.F. Skinner variety was a popular approach to the study of the human consciousness. Behaviorism treats consciousness as the product a black box and cares not at all how particular behaviors are produced; behaviorism was merely concerned with predicting future behavior. Needless to say, treating the human skull as a black box is not very philosophically satisfying.

The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics treats the Heisenberg limited regime as a black box; that is, it is a "behavioristic" theory of physics--it's mere bookkeeping in other words. Unfortunately, because of the HUP, there is no prospect of directly looking inside as is possible with modern neurological techniques.

So the question is, does treating the quantum realm as if it were a black box imply that the quantum realm really is a black box? Empirically, the answer doesn't matter. Technologically, the answer doesn't matter. But philosophically, the answer is very important.

Indeed, what does it really mean to say that the quantum realm is a black box and that nothing more can be said? For one thing, such a position is self-defeating and fundamentally mysterian and therefore anathema to the proper spirit of scientific enquiry.

For another, it implies that the quantum realm is unlike anything else in experience: it implies that the quantum realm is naturally indeterministic and apparently partless. Indeterminism and partlessness maybe mathematically simple to model, but they are ontologically huge bells and whistles--it's not at all clear to me at least such an explanation is the more parsimonious.

The Bohmian approach multiplies entities, to be sure, but these at least are not ontologically distinct from ordinary tables and chairs. The "hidden variables" are reassuringly deterministic and imply that there are parts at work, even though the parts are beyond our ability to resolve.