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Originally Posted by Warren Platts
Bohmian physics as I understand it, on the other hand, holds out for the possibility that there might still be mechanisms analogous to a camshaft that cannot be seen by the application, however precise, of clumsy photons. Imagine trying to explain the behavior of an internal combustion engine if you weren't allowed to take the thing entirely apart.
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You said it best earlier in this thread:
"The preferable approach depends on one's purposes." Leibniz thought the major flaw of Newton's theory was that it didn't explain the cause or mechanism of gravity. Newton thought his theory was stronger because it worked regardless of any cause. Newton puts the universe in reach of the capabilities of high school students. Einstein doesn't. Just because a theory may be simpler doesn't make it "clumsy." As you suggested, it is the context provided by one's purposes that defines a theory's value.
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You would come up with a mathematical description that would contain variables that would describe the hidden mechanism of the camshaft. Hence, you would have a theory of "hidden variables"; and it wouldn't be a category mistake to characterize that theory as an attempt at part-whole reductionism: you can't directly access the hidden mechanism, but you take it on faith that it is ontologically similar to the things you can access--that is, that the hidden mechanism is mechanical in nature.
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This is where I part company with everyone else here. I don't think a theory is a replica of the phenomena it is about. A mathematical description of an engine's behavior is not itself a kind of engine. A hidden variable is not a species of camshaft. To borrow from something Ken said earlier, we already have the engine. We need to use the engine. Mathematics is a process of organizing our activities around the engine. (The ink markings of the equations otherwise are just that: scribbles on paper.) Hidden variables, as I understand them, allow us to fine-tune our actions, to be responsive to the subtler behaviors of the engine.
That's why I don't think quantum mechanics (or Newton, or Einstein, or any other physical theory) can be faulted for missing an underlying mechanism. A theory is not a mechanism itself. A theory puts us in contact with the aspects of phenomena that are most relevant to us at the time. Our purposes will define a theory's value. Bohm will become the better theory when we can do with it more than we can do with quantum mechanics.