Ken,

"I think the problem here is that we have forgotten the proper order of logic in science. We invent concepts like "determinism" because they serve a particular model of reality. At what point does our invention transcend the models and become a part of reality itself? At no point. So it is just arse-backwards to say, "hmmm, reality does not always appear to obey our invention of determinism, therefore it must really be deterministic in ways we haven't figured out yet or can't apply in practice." It might be true, or it might not, and it is fine to look for determinism once we have established the usefulness of the concept. But to do anything more than look for it, to assert it is there and we simply haven't found it yet, is simply awful science-- and that was true even before the HUP."

Totally agree with everything you wrote. One of the reasons i've always been very skeptical of the whole Deterministic concept is that the universe seems to work fine without us having to know all initial conditions. If QM works well enough without certainty then what more value or usefulness would certainty add if it was available? Would there be a material difference? Could we do things that we could not do with copenhagen non-deterministic qm?

Perhaps someone with the knowledge can answer that. If there is some differential ability set loose by a Determinsitic qm, then its absence in the non-determinstic qm variety might explain some things. However if there is no material change to science or our practical ability to manipulate the universe through an observationally Determinsitic model of qm; then i think that rules out Bohmian or other hidden variables theories. If a particle has defined properties on some other deeper level than the HUP and it made no material difference to the universe there would seem no rational reason for it to be hidden from us, or from some other enquiring emergent biolgy. Why go through the hassle of complicating or masking the true - though unimportant - nature of the universe?