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Originally Posted by Richard J. Hanak
I did say “In short, a physical thing…” It seems it was too short. I apologize. According to that definition of ‘thing’ a physical thing is that which is conceived, spoken of, or referred to as existing as an individual, distinguishable physical entity. If two physical entities were to occupy the same space at the same time, one could not be distinguished from the other. Therefore, if one physical entity is to be distinguishable from another, it must be separate from the other. In other words, a physical thing is a physical entity separate from other physical entities.
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Richard, I'm sorry I still don't follow this at all. I don't think a thing has to be distinguished from other thing at all, except in perception. For example, Europe is made up of a bunch of countries. In fact, Europe cannot be distinguished from the collection of say, German, France, etc., etc. But I still claim that Europe exists as a separate thing, because I perceive Europe to be something that has its own existence.
You asked me for a defintion of the universe. I don't think a precise definition is all that important, because there are issues between what we mean by "universe" and "cosmos" -- are they the same or different concepts? -- but to me they are roughly equivalent, meaning the larger thing, or rather the largest thing, to which those other things like stars and galaxies are part of.
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The connection is that the BB theory assumes that the universe is a physical thing to which physical properties and a history can be attributed. Without that assumption there could be no BB theory. If the idea of the universe as a physical thing to which physical properties and a history can be attributed is not justifiable, then there is no such universe. If that is so, then the BB theory proposes properties and a history for a thing that does not exist.
What historical fact do you mean?
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What I mean to say by a historical fact is this: to me, the question of whether the BB happened or not is an empirical issue. It depends on whether the evidence shows that the BB happened or not.
You write that there can be no BB theory without the assumption that the universe is a physical thing. I would say that to me, it seems that any cosmological model would have to take the same assumption. Or rather, I don't see how an assumption about whether the universe is a valid concept or not would have any relevance whatsoever in the cosmological model you would find acceptable. Unless of course you're talking about something like a digital universe or maybe a Buddhist universe or something where nothing really exists in reality.