Well put, that's my page exactly. Granted, there's nothing wrong with being optimistic about what humanity may one day know about our universe, and there's nothing wrong with Grey taking the view that we should worry about phenomena only when we run into it in our theories or observations, but the danger is that such a present-ocentric view tends to lead to scientific hubris. I'm not saying there's any hubris in Grey's stated position, the hubris tends to appear more when science 'faces off' against non-quantitative or non-objective attempts at knowing something about our reality. When that happens, I feel all camps are best left to defend their own turf, but not to "invade" into the turf of the other approaches except on grounds that they are being intellectually dishonest or untrue to their own stated art. I pretty much cringe every time I hear the absurd phrase "theory of everything", and theories about the Planck domain give me a similar sensation.