'Missile defence shield' does it actually work ?

[Launch window]

With worries about Iran's nuclear programme and talk of the N.Koreans doing more missile tests it is very understanable how the US would like to be able to defend against these types of potential threats. But does a 'defence shield' really work, some articles I've read say it will be able to defend the United Sates, and it will prevent any hostile nation from attacking America.

Others I've seen say its the greatest waste of money on a project that's never going to work, I know there have been a number of failures reported on the multi-billion dollar anti-missile shield. Firstly an infrared sensing satellite detects the heat from the launch and relays that information to U.S. ships with their tracking systems, Alaska radars then attempt to track the missile, then finally an interceptor missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California tires to blast in out of the sky. In tests the target seem to successfully intercept a 'staged hositle attack' about 50% of the time. The programme has been nicknamed "son of Star Wars" Other articles point out that if the US were to have a nuclear showdown with a real opponent like Russia or China who have MIRVs (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle) this shield wouldn't work.
here's a pic of an mirv
http://www.marteydodoo.com/images/wallpaper/Peacekeeper-640x480.jpg
Then the only real defence is MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) a number of other news articles say that the Son of Starwars breaks the anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and might cause Russia, the British, the Chinese, the French, Pakistan and India to start investing in another arms race. Another probelm with the shield is it seems to be prone to bad weather, what if the Russians or Chinese attacked when it was cloudy or raining ?


Please keep any Bush Vs Clinton politics out of this,

My question is : does the shield really work ? and is it worth the multi-billion US dollars put into it ? I've a feeling that the 'shield' would be good enough to take out an ordinary IRBM or scud missile, but if it came down to defending a real attack from someone like the Russians the shiled would never work even if we were living in 1960s.

[Captain Kidd]

Well, there's one way to find out for certain.:think:

[Doodler]

From what I read about the last test, it worked well enough despite the fact that it wasn't running with quite the same stacked deck that the earlier proof of concept systems did in feeding the interceptor information it wouldn't have in the operational version.

This last test was strictly an aquisition test to see if the system could locate an inbound, it didn't have to have an intercept to be considered successful, it just had to find the inbound. Apparently, it did the job as advertised with the benefit of a successful intercept.

Will it work in a live operation as opposed to a test? Anyone's guess really, the best hope is never having to find out. I do think less is made of the ballistic missile threat than it should be. People seem to have forgotten that ballistic missiles don't need nuclear payloads to wreak havoc. Not enough V-2 footage circulates, apparently.

[Dragon Star]

My .02...

I believe the Laser defense system is much better then an intercepting missile will ever be.

[Doodler]

My .02...

I believe the Laser defense system is much better then an intercepting missile will ever be.

I've seen the test of one of those designed to shoot down inbound artillery shells. That thing is sexy.

[Launch window]

Well, there's one way to find out for certain.:think:

I guess no one is certain whether the interceptors actually work but as long as "no one" in Iran or North Korea really knows that, then its kind of a vaccine against a country getting a missile and a nuke and thinking they're king of the world.

Will it ever really work? I suppose that question looms as large if not larger for anyone contemplating launching an attack on the US as it does for functionality of USA's shield

[Dragon Star]

Indeed...

Here is a neat link about some of the stuff related to it if anyone is interested.

http://lfw.pennnet.com/Articles/Article_Display.cfm?ARTICLE_ID=259829&p=12

EDITED to change links, mistakenly copied the wrong one.

[korjik]

possible? yes. Easy? nooooooo.

I do think that any technical hurdle can be overcome. Wether we can afford to spend the rather immense amounts of cash is another story.

If I am remembering right, this current missle defence is a very modest small scale system, only designed to shoot down a small number of incoming missiles. It is not to protect north america from a full scale nuclear war, but to stop a few missiles at once from a rogue nation that is trying some nuclear blackmail. In this rather limited case, and with the current world situation the way it is, I think some sort of defence is a good idea, and the only way to make it work is to build it and test it.

I dont have much confidence in the current system, as it is an unproven, experimental system, but I do think that as more work is done and more tests are done, the system is a feasable one.

One problem with using MAD as a defence, is that it assumes that the other side is rational, and wants to live. I would rather trust an untested missile defence system.

[Jeff Root]

If you want to destroy Minneapolis with a nuclear weapon,
smuggle it into the USA inside a bale of marijuana. Easy,
simple, and vastly less expensive than using an ICBM.

Please don't, though. It wouldn't be a nice thing to do.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis

[Launch window]

If you want to destroy Minneapolis with a nuclear weapon,
smuggle it into the USA inside a bale of marijuana. Easy,
simple, and vastly less expensive than using an ICBM.


I agree that some areas of homeland security are a bit of a joke while stuff like Afghanistan heroin is flowing on US streets but isn't this starting to go a bit off-topic.

The question remains does the missile shield system really shoot down nuclear missiles ? I think it would be reasonably successful against a number of missiles.

[Ilya]

One problem with using MAD as a defence, is that it assumes that the other side is rational, and wants to live. I would rather trust an untested missile defence system.
Given the mindset of Soviet leadership, MAD was exactly the right strategy.

With Kim Jong Il I am not so sure. He very likely wants to live, but is not very rational about it.

With Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, MAD is useless. They WANT Armageddon which will bring the 12th Imam and the global triumph of Islam.

Ironically, for MAD to work you need sane enemies.

[Jeff Root]

Beginning about 15 minutes after hearing the first public mention
of a "nuclear shield" on TV in 1982, my greatest fear was that
the USA would be turned into a police state in order to prevent
nuclear weapons from being brought in to get around the "shield".

But I'm not worried about it happening anymore. It's happened.
Even though we don't have a shield.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis

[Ilya]

Jeff --

Sorry, but you have no clue what a REAL police state is like.

Having said that, I agree that the concept of "privacy" is pretty much gone, and a generation hence will be remembered as a quaint passing fad at best, a dangeorus folly at worst. Of course, there was no such thing as privacy through most of human history either.

[Lurker]

Beginning about 15 minutes after hearing the first public mention
of a "nuclear shield" on TV in 1982, my greatest fear was that
the USA would be turned into a police state in order to prevent
nuclear weapons from being brought in to get around the "shield".

But I'm not worried about it happening anymore. It's happened.
Even though we don't have a shield.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis
Gee Jeff... a bit political don't you think. We may have problems in this country, but the current climate is pretty far from a police state...

With that I bow out and put my bet in the pool for the "time-to-lock" for this thread... :)

[Doodler]

Given the mindset of Soviet leadership, MAD was exactly the right strategy.

With Kim Jong Il I am not so sure. He very likely wants to live, but is not very rational about it.

With Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, MAD is useless. They WANT Armageddon which will bring the 12th Imam and the global triumph of Islam.

Ironically, for MAD to work you need sane enemies.

That was something that the US tried to bend over backwards to make clear to the Russian Federation when it backed out of the missile defense treaty.

"Eh, guys, this ain't about you, really."

I haven't lost sleep over a Russian missile since the first bilateral inspections in 1993-1994.

[Jeff Root]

The question remains does the missile shield system really
shoot down nuclear missiles ? I think it would be reasonably
successful against a number of missiles.
Yes. If there were several missiles all coming from a
location known to be a missile launch site, it is likely
that some of them would be intercepted. If only one missile
was launched, it would be almost impossible to determine
whether it was an attack or something else until the missile
actually hit.

An interesting thing about a defensive shield is that it needs
about as many interceptors to provide a reasonable chance of
intercepting a single ICBM as are needed to give a reasonable
chance of intercepting a majority of a whole barrage of ICBMs.

All a shield could do is reduce the number of on-target hits.
But ICBMs are such an expensive and unreliable way of delivering
nukes that it is unlikely that anyone would use that method.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis

[Jeff Root]

Sorry, but you have no clue what a REAL police state is like.
We have a police state. It isn't bad yet, though. Not bad at
all compared to many that have existed and do exist elsewhere.
It doesn't have anything remotely close to absolute power. But
it has power. I was worried that we would have a police state.
Now I'm worried how bad it will get.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis

[Doodler]

We have a police state. It isn't bad yet, though. Not bad at
all compared to many that have existed and do exist elsewhere.
It doesn't have anything remotely close to absolute power. But
it has power. I was worried that we would have a police state.
Now I'm worried how bad it will get.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis

Since you seem hellbent on making this political, lemme shovel the last heap of dirt on this otherwise interesting discussion.

Unless some unforseen action causes elections to be suspended sometime in the next 20 days, we're not a police state, and its only on us if it becomes one as a result.

[Launch window]

Yes. If there were several missiles all coming from a
location known to be a missile launch site, it is likely
that some of them would be intercepted.

Let's try to keep all politcs out of this and stick to the facts on missile defence


As far as I understand there was also trouble in tracking where they were going to launch from because the Russians had not only Subs and Aircraft that launched nuclear missiles (submarines and planes are difficult to track anyway)
but they had built road-mobile launchers

Russian launchers
http://www.nato.int/pictures/review/9706/b0700002.jpg
mock mobile MX Peacekeeper (American)
http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/PhotoLibrary/mx7.jpg


I just think if the missile-shiled is able to prevent a potential enemy like Iran from hitting US intrests or block an attack from N.Korea then it might be worth the money, but I don't think the missile defence is all its hyped up to be. Would it have even defended against the Russians during the 60s ? I doubt it very much

[Ilya]

Setting aside nutcases who actually want Armageddon, I can think of one rational reason some Third World strongman would threaten US with ICBM’s, and a consequent reason for US to have a missile shield.

Freedom to wage war against his neighbors without superpower interference.

A Saddam, or an Assad, or a Kabila all know that launching an unprovoked missile attack against United States is suicide. Moreover, once they begin building nuclear bombs, a terrorist nuclear strike against US is also suicide. Realistically, if a nuke went off in Minneapolis, Iran would be flattened whether they were actually involved or not.

But the key word above is “unprovoked”. If a local dictator armed with ICBM’s starts a local war, he can announce that an armed interference from US, or from any other major power, would be met with a nuclear strike. IOW, his own little version of MAD. Of course, he’d have no chance of actually wiping out United States, but he would not need to. No American president would risk losing even one city in such situation. OTOH, a working missile shield – “working” in the sense that it can stop few missiles the local dictator might have, - allows US to call his bluff.

So if US does not care to involve in the Third World power games, then it does not really need a missile shield. If it does, then it needs one. Of course, given the lunatics which currently run Iran the above is moot. We DO need a missile shield.

[Ilya]

Would it have even defended against the Russians during the 60s ?
Absolutely not. They would have simlpy swamped it with numbers.

[BigDon]

Jeff,

Ever done any travel outside the US? Iyla is right you know (or not). I've been to Africa and the Middle East. I've had to keep quiet when people were being beaten to death in the street in front of God and public. You don't see that much around here.

[Lurker]

We have a police state. It isn't bad yet, though. Not bad at
all compared to many that have existed and do exist elsewhere.
It doesn't have anything remotely close to absolute power. But
it has power. I was worried that we would have a police state.
Now I'm worried how bad it will get.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis
yeah... right... perhaps you should do a bit of reading up on police states...

get thee to a library... :)

[Doodler]

Absolutely not. They would have simlpy swamped it with numbers.

Given the operational status we saw during the reduction inspections, eh, mildly questionable.

[Ilya]

Given the operational status we saw during the reduction inspections, eh, mildly questionable.
No way to prove it, but I suspect Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces were in better shape in 1963 than in 1993.

[Doodler]

No way to prove it, but I suspect Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces were in better shape in 1963 than in 1993.

Good point. The warranties hadn't expired yet. :)

[ToSeek]

We shouldn't need to remind any of the posters here of Rule 12 of this forum, but I will do so anyway:

12. Politics & Religion

Due to the contentious nature of these subjects, forum participants are strongly advised to avoid discussing religious and political issues. Please don't begin or contribute to a topic that's merely going to incite or fuel a flame war.

However, the following exceptions apply:

A) Political impact upon space programs, exploration, and science.

B) Focused, polite discussion of concepts such as creationism and "intelligent design" which bear direct relevance to astronomy and science, for the purposes of conversing about and addressing misconceptions.

C) Focused, polite discussion of the difference between astronomy (including cosmology) and religion

Partisan political debate is unwelcome and should be undertaken elsewhere. The same applies to debates purely religious in nature. Likewise, proselytizing will not be allowed. In short, you are allowed to discuss politics and religion within a very limited scope where they affect space and space exploration, astronomy, and science. Nothing more. If you really really need to talk about these topics with someone, take it to email or to another bulletin board.

I would rather not have to close this thread because it has strayed into inappropriate topics, or to discipline users for causing it to do so, but I will do so if necessary. Jeff, this goes particularly to you as the one who brought in political subjects to start with, but the rest of you should know better than to respond (though I realize it's hard to refrain from rebutting when you disagree with such comments).

[Lurker]

You didn't lock it... I lose the time to lock pool... and I got a nice low number too... :(

[Doodler]

You didn't lock it... I lose the time to lock pool... and I got a nice low number too... :(

The discussion on the technical aspects of this system are one thing, on the other side, its almost impossible to discuss it without touching on why it exists. Shades of gray...

[Launch window]

Good point. The warranties hadn't expired yet. :)


Certainly much of the Russian military might certainly died off when the USSR fell down, but I know Putin (former KGB) has been trying to modernize the Russian military and has been investing in new missile tech for Russia, the new missiles reportedly can maneuver in ways that are difficult to detect and perhaps building heavyweight Russian ICBMs with 10 or more warheads. One of the problems the USA has in this area is that it hasn't built a new ICBM in decades but currently there are about 17 MX missiles on active duty with 10 MIRVs each. However the fact the US has Stealth bomber aircraft and Subs with SLBMs remained real deterrent for most opposing nations which was why MAD worked. The quest for a missile shield has been fraught with controversy mostly because of its cost, like the Space Shuttle it is cost the US tax payer a lot of money. The United States has spent about 100 billion dollars to develop a defensive missile shield which still might not protect America very well.

[Doodler]

Certainly much of the Russian military might certainly died off when the USSR fell down, but I know Putin (former KGB) has been trying to modernize the Russian military and has been investing in new missile tech for Russia, the new missiles reportedly can maneuver in ways that are difficult to detect and perhaps building heavyweight Russian ICBMs with 10 or more warheads. One of the problems the USA has in this area is that it hasn't built a new ICBM in decades but currently there are about 17 MX missiles on active duty with 10 MIRVs each. However the fact the US has Stealth bomber aircraft and Subs with SLBMs remained real deterrent for most opposing nations which was why MAD worked. The quest for a missile shield has been fraught with controversy mostly because of its cost, like the Space Shuttle it is cost the US tax payer a lot of money. The United States has spent about 100 billion dollars to develop a defensive missile shield which still might not protect America very well.

Its a question of whether something is better than nothing, and the intended object against which its defending. Even with the pared down missile forces, unless you plan on covering the Canadian wilderness with launchers (yeah, right), this system isn't going to amount to much more than a wall of gauze in an all out slugging match with Russia. Heck, even if it does work, you've still got US warheads going off, Russian high grade material raining down over the north pole and Canada (which will make us REAL popular) and generally all the nasty side effects that go along with a major nuclear engagement.

I don't see that as the intention of the system. The US and Russia are old enough hands at the nuclear game that neither side really sees much benefit to actually going at it. They've been to the brink, they both blinked and realized it was stupid. Against someone with a smaller scale program, that's a different ballgame. 9/11 shocked this country to a halt, and it was about as conventional a shock attack as you can imagine, just scaled up to pretty epic proportions.

I don't see most future ICBM attacks being nuclear. The technology is too volatile to let loose without horrendous consequences. Even India and Pakistan during their scuffle over Kashmir didn't bring the missile forces online. However, given the pervasiveness of satellite launching systems coming online in countries that don't necessarily like us, an ICBM program that works like an uberKatayusha or uberSCUD is a different story. Going nuclear carries nasty consequences, but to rain down a conventional missile that's only doing local damage, but with no idea where exactly, or worse, knowing that SAC's watching like a hawk, exactly where and being powerless to stop it? Sure, its condemnable, but its not going to trigger armageddon, either.

Its a terror weapon that's most likely to become the next generation of ICBM, not a civilization killer. Something that could end up being used a lot more liberally than its city wiping cousin. THAT is a legitimate reason to build a small scale missile defense system.

[Gillianren]

Circa 1986, my mother went back to school for a degree in "Laser Electro-Optics." One of her professors was at the time working on SDI. My mother's professor said it wouldn't work.

Now, I admit, my information on same is now 20 years (oh, gods) out of date. But I haven't heard anything more recent from someone actually working on the system, not a politician.

[Maksutov]

When "Star Wars" was announced back in the 1980s, I had been working on, among other things, certain components and assemblies for something called a Tomahawk. Some of the other things involved the submarine force.

My initial reaction was, this provides defenses (perhaps) against ICBMs. Therefore a smart enemy will rechannel their efforts into sub-launched missiles that use low-altitude trajectories, and cruise missiles. The space-based defense system would be of no use against these two delivery methods since they would hardly get out of the troposphere in one case, and be barely above ground in the other.

Same deal re the current system. It can't stop sub-launched, low-altitude trajectory missiles, nor it is of any use against cruise missiles.

So if we have an effective defense against ICBMs, guess where resources will be redeployed by those who would harm us? Simple military strategy.

[Nereid]

[snip]

So if we have an effective defense against ICBMs, guess where resources will be redeployed by those who would harm us? Simple military strategy.Fast boats from unnamed Caribbean islands (just dump the drugs)?

Zodiacs from trawlers off the Oregon coast?

Inside the high-density machinery parts in containers, delivered to out-of-the-way ports?

On golf carts, in tunnels under the border, near San Diego?

Helicopters across the border, in eastern Washington state?

I give up; where would the resources be redeployed to?

[Lurker]

The difficulty with missle defense systems is that there are always ways to overwhelm them... Take each missle with a biiig warhead and makes lots of little ones... then just throw them all at the defense shield.

This is not Battlestar Galactica... this is the real world. There is not "invisible" shield that keeps everything out...

Oh come on Nereid!! Its obvious... they are going to build em weapons to distroy all our gameboys!! :)
Its inhuman... but that's why they call them terrorists!!! :neutral:

[Larry Jacks]

The point about the current missile defense system is being able to negate a small nuclear power's ability to use nuclear blackmail. Take North Korea as an example. There's strong evidence they're attempting to build nuclear weapons and may already have a few. They're also trying to build long range missiles. Put the two together and they have the ability to blackmail the US into inaction should they decide to repeat their 1950 invasion of South Korea. Without any form of missile defense, North Korea could threaten to destroy an American city (say Honolulu or Anchorage) if we intervened. With missile defense, they wouldn't be able to blackmail us.

Missile defense is no more a total solution against all threats than body armor is complete protection against getting shot. Missile defense is useless against smuggled weapons or cruise missiles. Likewise, body armor doesn't do you any good if you get shot in the leg (you can bleed out pretty quick) or the face. That doesn't mean body armor should be abandoned, and IMO neither should missile defense. In this vein, there are efforts underway to protect against low flying cruise missiles and against smuggled weapons. They just don't get as much press.

[Jens]

The difficulty with missle defense systems is that there are always ways to overwhelm them... Take each missle with a biiig warhead and makes lots of little ones... then just throw them all at the defense shield.


Yes, that's the big issue that I see with it. Even if you can intercept missiles pretty well, wouldn't it be possible for a state like North Korea to simply launch a barrage of missiles, mostly cheap and unarmed. Suppose NK had two warheads, and then made 100 SCUD-type things and launched them all at South Korea or Japan. We wouldn't necessarily know which ones are the real ones.

[BigDon]

Jens, except the build up would be obvious and warrent pre-emptive action. (We can do that now.)

[Maksutov]

Fast boats from unnamed Caribbean islands (just dump the drugs)?

Zodiacs from trawlers off the Oregon coast?

Inside the high-density machinery parts in containers, delivered to out-of-the-way ports?

On golf carts, in tunnels under the border, near San Diego?

Helicopters across the border, in eastern Washington state?

I give up; where would the resources be redeployed to?Sub-launched missiles that use low-altitude trajectories, and cruise missiles.

We've already used one of these methods on a certain Middle East country.

Any other questions?

http://img396.imageshack.us/img396/3461/iconcool9io.gif

[Launch window]

Yes, that's the big issue that I see with it. Even if you can intercept missiles pretty well, wouldn't it be possible for a state like North Korea to simply launch a barrage of missiles, mostly cheap and unarmed. Suppose NK had two warheads, and then made 100 SCUD-type things and launched them all at South Korea or Japan. We wouldn't necessarily know which ones are the real ones.


Which makes me ask another question - if the real reason this missile defence is being built is because of Iran and N.Korea. Why are the majority of missile defence systems in Alaska, a defence system in Alaska is too far away to protect anyone in Hawaii or people working in US embassy in Asian or any US troops in overseas territory or bases in the Philippines.

For North Korea - I think Hawaii, S.Korea...or somewhere closer to Pyongyang would work better as part of this defensive shiled


and if Iran is a threat - Then defensive systems should be set up in India, Greece, Kuwait, Turkey or whichever ally or diplomatic friend is closest to them and can prevent Iran from launching an attack.
Much like the time during the cold war against the Soviets when the United States had its missile installations in Turkey

There were reports some years back that Iran was going to build a Shahab missile with a range of a few thousand kilometres
http://www.sarbaz.org/articles/WMD/shahab-6.htm
So what good is a defensive shiled all the way up in Alaska when some guy like Ayotollah Khomeini perhaps wants to take his warhead on a direct route to NewYork or London, I can't imagine them taking the long route and flying their missile over Alaska wanting to get it blasted out of the sky before it reaches its target.

[Doodler]

When "Star Wars" was announced back in the 1980s, I had been working on, among other things, certain components and assemblies for something called a Tomahawk. Some of the other things involved the submarine force.

My initial reaction was, this provides defenses (perhaps) against ICBMs. Therefore a smart enemy will rechannel their efforts into sub-launched missiles that use low-altitude trajectories, and cruise missiles. The space-based defense system would be of no use against these two delivery methods since they would hardly get out of the troposphere in one case, and be barely above ground in the other.

Same deal re the current system. It can't stop sub-launched, low-altitude trajectory missiles, nor it is of any use against cruise missiles.

So if we have an effective defense against ICBMs, guess where resources will be redeployed by those who would harm us? Simple military strategy.

Ehm, this last test was against a submarine launched missle. And during the first Iraq war, we discovered that the Baghdad AAA cover was sufficient to bring down a number of cruise missiles, the aforementioned Tomahawks.

[BigDon]

Ehm, this last test was against a submarine launched missle. And during the first Iraq war, we discovered that the Baghdad AAA cover was sufficient to bring down a number of cruise missiles, the aforementioned Tomahawks.

Weren't those actually Harpoons? I thought Tomahawks were mainly antishipping, or do I have that reversed?

[Doodler]

Weren't those actually Harpoons? I thought Tomahawks were mainly antishipping, or do I have that reversed?

I think you've got'em backwards.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harpoon_missile
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BGM-109_Tomahawk

[Moose]

Weren't those actually Harpoons? I thought Tomahawks were mainly antishipping, or do I have that reversed?

Yeah, you've got 'em reversed. But IIRC, there's a variant of the Tomahawk that's designed for ship-hunting.

[Doodler]

Yeah, you've got 'em reversed. But IIRC, there's a variant of the Tomahawk that's designed for ship-hunting.


TASM (Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile)

Doncha love it when the alphabet soup actually makes sense? :)

[Moose]

TASM (Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile)

Doncha love it when the alphabet soup actually makes sense? :)

You know it. I'd gotten a cliff notes type pamphlet of the relevant Janes' pages with one of my sub sims (688i, IIRC). I'd read up a bit on the Tomahawks as a result, trying to figure out how to use as few Tomahawks as possible* to "encourage" a SAM site to either go away or DIAF**.

* Answer: Spam the emplacement with a Time-On-Target style attack from multiple directions. Had to guestimate (somewhat) on the loiter times, though.)

** It chose the latter. :D

[korjik]

Which makes me ask another question - if the real reason this missile defence is being built is because of Iran and N.Korea. Why are the majority of missile defence systems in Alaska, a defence system in Alaska is too far away to protect anyone in Hawaii or people working in US embassy in Asian or any US troops in overseas territory or bases in the Philippines.

For North Korea - I think Hawaii, S.Korea...or somewhere closer to Pyongyang would work better as part of this defensive shiled


and if Iran is a threat - Then defensive systems should be set up in India, Greece, Kuwait, Turkey or whichever ally or diplomatic friend is closest to them and can prevent Iran from launching an attack.
Much like the time during the cold war against the Soviets when the United States had its missile installations in Turkey

There were reports some years back that Iran was going to build a Shahab missile with a range of a few thousand kilometres
http://www.sarbaz.org/articles/WMD/shahab-6.htm
So what good is a defensive shiled all the way up in Alaska when some guy like Ayotollah Khomeini perhaps wants to take his warhead on a direct route to NewYork or London, I can't imagine them taking the long route and flying their missile over Alaska wanting to get it blasted out of the sky before it reaches its target.

To me it seems pretty obvious that the current missile defence is set up to intercept North Korean shots at the west coast of north america. It may have a secondary objective of keeping the chinese honest, or giving us the capability to start some serious economic warfare (arms race) with the chinese by scaling up the system. In this case, the sub launched threat is non-existent. Neither the chinese ot the nk have subs that could get close enough to the west coast to toss some short ranged stuff.

I dont think that the current plan is to defend against iranian missiles at all, since there are no current missiles that can even come close to the mainland US. I would imagine that the isrealis would love some anti-missile systems, but I would bet their eyes bugged out when they saw how much it would cost.

[Doodler]

I dunno, it doesn't strike me as being too much more than a guided missile with a networked tracking system. Kinda like a Patriot Deluxe Edition. The development sounds more like an agonizing exercise in the integration of existing technology, rather than something from scratch.

Once you know HOW to do it, actually doing it is cake.

[korjik]

I dunno, it doesn't strike me as being too much more than a guided missile with a networked tracking system. Kinda like a Patriot Deluxe Edition. The development sounds more like an agonizing exercise in the integration of existing technology, rather than something from scratch.

Once you know HOW to do it, actually doing it is cake.

I think the truly expensive part is the radars. You would need to have a 3-D capability to get the missile tracking done. That means several big, high power systems.

[Kebsis]

I'd imagine that MAD is a considerably better deterent than any defense system could be. I doubt many people with the funding and capability to build an ICBM would be willing to use them. Even if they are insanerifically crazy, they would probably understand that life will be alot better for them if they simply insult and decry the US, and ride the swell of public support from their citizens all the way to the bank. Versus actually attacking the US and being turned into a red mist.

[Doodler]

I'd imagine that MAD is a considerably better deterent than any defense system could be. I doubt many people with the funding and capability to build an ICBM would be willing to use them. Even if they are insanerifically crazy, they would probably understand that life will be alot better for them if they simply insult and decry the US, and ride the swell of public support from their citizens all the way to the bank. Versus actually attacking the US and being turned into a red mist.

Never not consider the alternative. For a single missile strike, MAD retaliation still doesn't make any sense, because the consequential loss of life would be far above and beyond the consequence of taking one on the chin and moving forward in a conventional manner against the offender.

This system is about the realization that an all out global nuclear conflict is outrageously unlikely because the consequences are their own deterrent. Smaller scale nuclear weapon use, such as the US strikes against Japan in WWII, are a little more likely. One off terror style strikes are also a possibility. Missile terrorism is a reality, its been done. Hitler did it with the V-2, Saddam did it with SCUDs, Hezbollah does the poor man's version with Katayushas. Its not so outrageous to consider the possibility someone, somewhere, somewhen, given the proliferation of large scale rocketry outside of the First World, is going to pull off a bigger strike.

This is one of the downsides to the expansion of the space market. The current generation of satellite launching technology evolved out of those first generation ballistic missiles. Its not a huge leap to image that technology could re-evolve back to its military origins.

[Lurker]

Jens, except the build up would be obvious and warrent pre-emptive action. (We can do that now.)
Pre-emptive action... so the United States decides to blow anyone out of the water who might build nuclear weapons??

oh I hope not...

[Kebsis]

Pre-emptive action... so the United States decides to blow anyone out of the water who might build nuclear weapons??

oh I hope not...

If they knew that N.Korea was building a fleet of missiles to fire at the U.S, I would hope they would, dont you?

[mike alexander]

It's just that when you back away from discussing all the fascinating technical details you realize what an insane species we can be on occasion.

[Maksutov]

Same deal re the current system. It can't stop sub-launched, low-altitude trajectory missiles, nor it is of any use against cruise missiles.(emphasis by Doodler)
Ehm, this last test was against a submarine launched missle.Ehm, that's why I specified low-trajectory sub-launched missiles. Plus if the missile is launched just off the coast, there's not much an outward facing defense will be able to do about it, especially given the amount of time from launch to delivery at the target.
And during the first Iraq war, we discovered that the Baghdad AAA cover was sufficient to bring down a number of cruise missiles, the aforementioned Tomahawks.Well, a person with a 12 gauge shotgun doesn't have to have a good aim to bring down one bird in a flock. Or a person. Just ask Dick Cheney.

http://img394.imageshack.us/img394/4879/iconbiggrin1kg.gif

PS: I take it you're saying Sadaam's AAA was as good as our new, cutting-edge anti-missile system? Wonder if he left the specifications lying around somewhere... :think:

[HenrikOlsen]

To me it seems pretty obvious that the current missile defence is set up to intercept North Korean shots at the west coast of north america.
To me it seems pretty obvious that the current missile defence is set up to fill the pockets of industrial leaders, rather than provide an effective defence against anything other than easy-for-the-press-to-digest threats that makes the politicians handing over the money look good.
Essentially a collusion between politicians and industry to steal even more taxmoney.

[Jens]

If they knew that N.Korea was building a fleet of missiles to fire at the U.S, I would hope they would, dont you?

Supposing they were building a fleet of missiles, how do you where they are planning to fire them?

If the answer is "we don't have to," then doesn't that mean that every country has to develop enough capability to counter an attack from every other country that has a missile fleet, doesn't it?

[Larry Jacks]

To me it seems pretty obvious that the current missile defence is set up to fill the pockets of industrial leaders, rather than provide an effective defence against anything other than easy-for-the-press-to-digest threats that makes the politicians handing over the money look good.
Essentially a collusion between politicians and industry to steal even more taxmoney.

Here's an exercise for the reader. Take a good sized globe (you can't use a flat map for this exercise). Locate Fairbanks, Alaska (near one of the missile defense launch sites) and Vandenberg AFB, California (the other launch site). Now, use a pencil and trace out a circle with a radius of at about 3000 kilometers (I'm not certain of the range of the ABMs but I'm guessing it's at least that far based on the interceptor flight times). Next, take a string and put one end on North Korea, China, and even Iran and the other at various possible targets in the US. See how many of the trajectories pass through the circles.

The problem most people have is they're looking at a map instead of a globe (2D vs 3D thinking). For example, if you're going to fly from North Korea to somewhere in California, looking at a map you might think that the shortest distance would take you somewhat near to Hawaii. By using a string on a globe, you'll be approximating the true shortest distance (a great circle route) and you'll find that you go right over the Aleutian Islands and near to Alaska.

Even a lot of the great circle routes from Iran to the US can pass within a 3000 kilometer radius of Alaska. And there's nothing preventing us from building a missile defense site on the US east coast, either.

I think the truly expensive part is the radars. You would need to have a 3-D capability to get the missile tracking done. That means several big, high power systems.

Once the radar upgrades to the Beale PAVE PAWS site are finished, it'll be a relatively straight-forward process to make the same upgrades to the identical Cape Cod PAVE PAWS site. Radars are expensive but the real big expense in a missile defense system is testing. Each test involves a target missile and an interceptor missile. That costs about $80 million each time.

Supposing they were building a fleet of missiles, how do you where they are planning to fire them?

Look at the range of the missiles and the likely targets within that range. You don't build a missile with a 5000 mile range to hit targets in a neighboring country. You build it to hit targets 5000 miles away. The capital of South Korea is within artillery range of the DMZ. North Korea doesn't need long range missiles to threaten the South.

[Doodler]

Pre-emptive action... so the United States decides to blow anyone out of the water who might build nuclear weapons??

oh I hope not...

Another possible facet. If we can knock down a reasonable number of them, we won't have to. :p

FYI, India and Pakistan are still there, along with North Korea. "Pre-emption" has been shown to amount to nothing more than a specific case of "lame excuse to mobilize".

[Doodler]

Ehm, that's why I specified low-trajectory sub-launched missiles. Plus if the missile is launched just off the coast, there's not much an outward facing defense will be able to do about it, especially given the amount of time from launch to delivery at the target.

---------------------------------------------------------------------
Well, a person with a 12 gauge shotgun doesn't have to have a good aim to bring down one bird in a flock. Or a person. Just ask Dick Cheney.

http://img394.imageshack.us/img394/4879/iconbiggrin1kg.gif
----------------------------------------------------------------------
PS: I take it you're saying Sadaam's AAA was as good as our new, cutting-edge anti-missile system? Wonder if he left the specifications lying around somewhere... :think:

Low trajectory, sublaunched missiles have two potential sources, on of which is most likely NOT the reason we're building this thing, and the other is the one actually building it.

Ok, got me there, even blind squirrels find nuts in the woods.

As you said, AAA doesn't have to be accurate just voluminous. This has been the case with cruise missiles since the V-1.

[Lurker]

Pre-emptive action... so the United States decides to blow anyone out of the water who might build nuclear weapons??

oh I hope not...
If they knew that N.Korea was building a fleet of missiles to fire at the U.S, I would hope they would, dont you?
Like we knew about Sadam's massive build of weapons of massive destruction??

gosh... when you put it that way.... :)

[ASEI]

Didn't the Russians have a sort of missile defense for Moscow, involving nuclear interceptor missiles? I think the idea was that a nuclear explosion didn't have to intercept an incoming ballistic missile directly. It just had to detonate within a few miles sphere of the incoming warhead to fry it. This would all occur somewhere out in space, and also take out passing sattelites as a bonus.

If we actually expected another nuclear war sometime soon (another cold war scenario with somebody else), wouldn't it make sense to try to get one of these ourselves? It's a lot better to fry a few sattelites and give astronauts a bad day than to start losing cities.

[BigDon]

The B-52's charged with penetrating Soviet airspace in the event of the "big one" had underwing SRAM's for dealing with whole squadron's of enemy interceptors at once. (Oh that's Short Range Atomic Missles) Since its all out war anyway you don't have to use a lot of subtlety.

[Lurker]

The B-52's charged with penetrating Soviet airspace in the event of the "big one" had underwing SRAM's for dealing with whole squadron's of enemy interceptors at once. (Oh that's Short Range Atomic Missles) Since its all out war anyway you don't have to use a lot of subtlety.
I am glad you cleared that up... I wondered how a bunch of Static RAM was going to help them out...

[Count Zero]

Didn't the Russians have a sort of missile defense for Moscow, involving nuclear interceptor missiles? I think the idea was that a nuclear explosion didn't have to intercept an incoming ballistic missile directly. It just had to detonate within a few miles sphere of the incoming warhead to fry it. This would all occur somewhere out in space, and also take out passing sattelites as a bonus.
They did, and still do. The Moscow ABM system has been operational for ~30 years. Originally it used the Galosh long-range missile. In the 1990's (even as cash-strapped as Russia was) they upgraded to a two-tiered system using the Gorgon advanced long-range ABM and the Gazelle high-speed point-defense ABM. This is similar to the Safeguard (http://www.paineless.id.au/missiles/HSafeguard.html) ABM system deployed by the United States in the Mid-'70s.
Safeguard defended an ICBM field. Since an effective counter-force strike would necessarily be massive in scale (the US had 1,154 ICBM silos across the country), the enemy would not have to stretch much to saturate the one defended missile field. Thus Safeguard was decommisioned almost immediately after it entered service.
The Russian concept has always been to defend against a counter-value strike (i.e. one that targeted cities) which may be of much more limited scope, especially coming from a "minor" adversary trying to get in a cheap-shot. The Moscow ABM system protects the Russian capitol from a limited strike or an accidental launch, rather than defending against an all-out saturation attack. They realize what many do not: That the price of failing to defend oneself is unacceptable. A single attack with a small number of conventional explosives cost the U.S. more than 50 billion dollars, not including the cost of waging war against the perpetrators. The cost of failing to defend against a limited, conventional missile attack is to me unacceptable, and I will gladly put my tax dollars towards an appropriate defense.
Yes, an ABM defense can be saturated, and WMDs can be delivered by means other than an ICBM. This is irrelevant to whether we should invest in such a defense. Consider using the same logic on the afore-mentioned nuke hidden in a bail of weed: No matter how much we spend on the FBI and Customs Service and the Coast Guard, they cannot guarantee that they could stop such an attack. Should we then cut funding to these agencies? Of course not, because some defense is better than none at all.

As to whether it'll work? That's an engineering problem, and we tend to be a lot better at resolving those than we are at resolving law-enforcement or diplomatic problems. Test failures don't bother me. If the history of rocketry shows us anything, it's that you learn more from your failures than your successes. We had five Atlas failures in a row, but that didn't stop us from launching John Glenn atop one less than a year later.

[Bob]

The B-52's charged with penetrating Soviet airspace in the event of the "big one" had underwing SRAM's for dealing with whole squadron's of enemy interceptors at once. (Oh that's Short Range Atomic Missles) .

The SRAM's you refer to are Short Range Attack Missiles, air to surface attack missiles with nuclear warheads, not air to air defensive missiles. The SRAM missile gave the B-52 and other US aircraft the ability to attack targets from a distance rather than have to completely penetrate the enemy's air defenses.

[BigDon]

Some of the folks who helped us with the F-14 avionics had prior experiance in the B-52 community. Some of the weapons used had a duel function from what the textbooks said. I had looked that up myself after they had told us of them as I hadn't heard of them before. Thought I would call them on it and they laughed at me. Sounded reasonable to me after that.

[publiusr]

It makes sense.

[erich]

Clint Seward of Electron Power Systems has proposed a kinetic weapon, with development cost of just millions.
http://www.electronpowersystems.com/ .

A 2003 DOD review of EPS technology reads as follows:

"MIT considers these plasmas a revolutionary breakthrough, with Delphi's
chief scientist and senior manager for advanced technology both agreeing
that EST/SPT physics are repeatable and theoretically explainable. MIT and
EPS have jointly authored numerous professional papers describing their
work. (Delphi is a $33B company, the spun off Delco Division of General
Motors)."

and

"Cost: no cost data available. The complexity of reliable mini-toroid
formation and acceleration with compact, relatively low-cost equipment
remains to be determined. Yet the fact that the EPS/MIT STTR work this
technology has attracted interest from Delphi is very significant, as the
automotive electronics industry is considered to be extremely demanding of
functionality per dollar and pound (e.g., mil-spec performance at
Wal-Mart-class 'commodity' prices)."

Erich

[publiusr]

I'm a bit skeptical. I hope I'm wrong.

[Monique]

Americans construct Maginot Line for new millennium. good luck :)

[captain swoop]

If the Maginot line had gone all the way to the coast and across the Ardennes then it might have worked

[Monique]

If the Maginot line had gone all the way to the coast and across the Ardennes then it might have worked
Perhaps. Static defense does not flexible. Guns aim out, but cannot aim in. Flaw of Maginot line, defend one strategy, other strategy defeat. Atlantic Wall, Siegfried Line, have better planning eventually breech(?)

[davidlpf]

Perhaps. Static defense does not flexible. Guns aim out, but cannot aim in. Flaw of Maginot line, defend one strategy, other strategy defeat. Atlantic Wall, Siegfried Line, have better planning eventually breech(?)
The german atlantic wall fell because the sent houndreds of thousands of people plus the parachute units behind the line and the lessons learned by the canadians at dieppe.

[Launch window]

I've got a feeling this Starwars shield will go ahead despite the fact that it doesn't really work.


With N.Korea making threats to blow up a nuke, the missile shield will be a lot more convincing than those 1950s Duck and Cover Videos


Is Ballistic Missile Defense Worth The Money
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Is_Ballistic_Missile_Defense_Worth_The_Money_999.h tml

[captain swoop]

If the Maginot line had covered the Ardennes then it would have given the French enough time to respond to a German attack, as the French thought the Ardennes region was impassable to an army they didn't bother. Of course they based their assumptions on the Germans not being able to move their artillery through the forested region. They based that assumption on the way they utilized their Artillery which was based on their experience of the 1st WW. that the germans would use Aircraft in place of artillery to support their advance never occured to them.

[Doodler]

Breaking news, we'd better hope it does. Its got a reason to work now.

[Monique]

The german atlantic wall fell because the sent houndreds of thousands of people plus the parachute units behind the line and the lessons learned by the canadians at dieppe.
Exactly. Is weakness. For missile defense shield, make thousands decoy. I do not say cannot work, I say have significant weekness.

[erich]

The North Korean Nukes:

My Cold warrior father, when asked about the basic strategy of Mutually assured destruction (MAD), would always paraphrase Patrick Henery :

"Give me Liberty or Give me Half-Life "

Erich

[sarongsong]

I've got a feeling this Starwars shield will go ahead despite the fact that it doesn't really work...D'oh!
(with http://bautforum.com/images/icons/icon6.gif illustrations):December 1, 2006
Pajamas Media (http://pajamasmedia.com/2006/12/star_wars_reduxdemocrats_to_gu.php#comments) has learned that the Bush administration is going to ask Congress for funding to begin development of an “orbital battle station”...to attack enemy missiles in their vulnerable boost phase. Each Battle Station would be a fairly large satellite that carried a number, perhaps 40 to 50 infrared guided “kill vehicles.” On orders from the ground, the battle station would launch these kill vehicles, roughly about the size of a loaf of bread...

[Dragon Star]

And it's not laser...why? :neutral:

[davidlpf]

And it's not laser...why? :neutral:
probably because they do not have a well tested power enough laser yet. they are just starting to test them aboard boeings now,

[BigDon]

Yeah the K.I.S.S system really applies in situations where the object in question is beyond your reach to repair. You want it to work every time you need it. Kinetic energy kills are just as lethal as "Gee Whiz" laser kills and already well engineered and implemented. Don't need a new technology base and infrastructure.

[ASEI]

Nuclear proliferation is somewhat inevitable. We can keep certain nutjobs from getting them temporarily (if we're willing to actually do something about their refinement plants, which in many cases we're not). But nuclear energy is going to be a mainstay of industrialized civilization for a long time. Furthermore, all the nutjobs which already have nuclear missiles, which we won't dare bother, can sell them and continue to improve them with impunity.

The bizzare, vehement resistance against trying to come up with defenses against ballistic missiles and other spaceborne weapons really bugs me. So a minimal, test interceptor program can't stop an all out nuclear assault by Russia? So a device designed to intercept incoming missiles can't intercept shipping containers or trucks speeding across the border? That just means you need more than a few test interceptors, and that you need better security along all your fronts; not that you bow before the demands of every bug-eyed nutcase with a bomb. Eventually they'll all have bombs! What are we going to do then? Surrender when our allies are picked off? Fall back before threats of nuclear assault as our enemies advance belligerent agendas throughout the world?

Anyway, my point is just because an interceptor can't do everything and isn't guaranteed to hit with 100% success rates doesn't mean that "doesn't work". If that's your standard, air to air missiles, rifles, and tanks don't "work" either. It just means you need more interceptors/incoming missile. The choice between spending at least as much money on interceptors as your enemy spends on nukes, or losing cities when he punches the button seems trivial to me. Missile defense, even if not perfect, puts the balance of power in MAD back in the hands of people who actually value human life.

As for lasers, my understanding of lasers is that, though we can supply the power to make them lethal from something like an aircraft turbine, they produce a whole lot of waste heat and the atmosphere gets in the way. Atmospheric lensing, water vapor, all kill or deflect your beam. That was one of the original motives for Star Wars in the first place - above the atmosphere you don't have any of those problems. Then the problem merely becomes one of pointing accuracy, and launching the sattelites to begin with. I suppose if we had enough ground based lasers, we could fill the sky over our country with beams to the point where one would be bound to hit, even if atmospheric lensing screws up their accuracy.

[Jeff Root]

Anyway, my point is just because an interceptor can't do everything
and isn't guaranteed to hit with 100% success rates doesn't mean
that "doesn't work".
The reason the system wouldn't work is that it would do nothing
to prevent nuclear weapons from reaching their targets. All it
could do is destroy intercontinental missiles and satellites. ICBMs
would be an extremely inefficient, expensive, risky, and unreliable
means of delivering nuclear weapons. And completely unnecessary.
They may have served and may even continue to serve a purpose
as a deterrent and as a show of force, but for practical use as a
delivery system for nuclear weapons, they are ridiculous.
Terrorists know that. Even North Korea knows that.

So an anti-missile system is about as useful as wearing a
bullet-proof vest to protect against mosquitos in an area with
endemic malaria.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis

[ASEI]

All it
could do is destroy intercontinental missiles and satellites. And aircraft, to some extent, if you're talking about lasers. But anyway, three major, rapid, global reach vectors of attack down. That there may be more vulnerabilities to go shouldn't stop us from covering these if we anticipate a threat on that front.

[Van Rijn]

And completely unnecessary.
They may have served and may even continue to serve a purpose
as a deterrent and as a show of force, but for practical use as a
delivery system for nuclear weapons, they are ridiculous.
Terrorists know that. Even North Korea knows that.


So a weapons delivery system that can't currently be stopped, can be launched from half way around the world, can reach target in a half hour, and can hit targets very precisely is ridiculous?

Riiiight.

Tell you what: When we find that everybody has stopped building nuclear missiles, then at that time I'd agree there was no point in a missile defense. Missile defense is important even if just for the possibility of accidental launch or a takeover of missile launch capability by a nut.

Bombs delivered by air give you much more warning of what's to come and can be dealt with using air defense. And if any get through, the enemy country would effectively cease to exist within a half hour from our missiles.

Now, "Suit case" bombs would be the absolute worst choice for a coordinated attack. Such an attack would have to be preplanned at a very early date while the weapons were put in place. That would give us a lot of time to find out what's going on, and if that happened, the attacking country is toast.

Furthermore, it would be difficult to place them near our land based retaliatory capability. While I could imagine a terrorist group, if they somehow managed to get a nuke, attempting a single bomb terrorist attack, I can't imagine a country going this route for a conventional attack. It would be guaranteed suicide.

[Maksutov]

Funny how Stanley Kubrick, Terry Southern, and Peter Sellers had this completely wrapped up back in 1964 (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0057012/plotsummary).


BTW, the "shield" will not work.

[Van Rijn]

BTW, the "shield" will not work.

If by that you mean that it is unlikely we could build a system that could stop all the missiles in a full scale Cold War-like exchange, I'd agree. If by that you mean that it isn't possible to build a system that could block a smaller scale attack, or a substantial portion of a full scale attack, I strongly disagree. However, such a system would require more R&D and a substantial investment.

[Maksutov]

If by that you mean that it is unlikely we could build a system that could stop all the missiles in a full scale Cold War-like exchange, I'd agree. If by that you mean that it isn't possible to build a system that could block a smaller scale attack, or a substantial portion of a full scale attack, I strongly disagree. However, such a system would require more R&D and a substantial investment.I was referring to the former, not the latter, so we're in agreement.

[Jeff Root]

They may have served and may even continue to serve a purpose
as a deterrent and as a show of force, but for practical use as
a delivery system for nuclear weapons, they are ridiculous.
So a weapons delivery system that can't currently be stopped, can
be launched from half way around the world, can reach target in a
half hour, and can hit targets very precisely is ridiculous?
We know that US-made ICBMs can hit targets halfway around the
world very precisely under controlled test conditions. There
is no evidence that any nation can actually hit a target
with an ICBM in an actual attack. Certainly, neither Iran nor
North Korea can do so, nor can any terrorist organization.


Tell you what: When we find that everybody has stopped building
nuclear missiles, then at that time I'd agree there was no point
in a missile defense.
What is your definition of a "nuclear missile"?
Who is currently building "nuclear missiles"?
I don't know-- PRC or India may currently be building ICBMs
designed to carry nuclear weapons. North Korea appears to be
trying to, although that isn't at all clear. As far as I know,
all other missiles currently being built are short-range.


Missile defense is important even if just for the possibility of
accidental launch or a takeover of missile launch capability by
a nut.
A gram of prevention is worth a kiloton of cure.

How would you know that the launch was accidental, if it was
launched by someone else? Would Russia call NATO and ask us to
shoot down an ICBM launched accidentally, or by a nut? Are you
saying that the best way to stop an ICBM launched from Wyoming,
either by a nut or by accident, would be to shoot it down?
There aren't alternatives which are far more reliable, far less
risky, far less expensive, and far quicker to implement?

If you knew the intended target, you might know whether trying
to shoot it down would be a good idea or not. But what if you
don't know the intended target? The target might be an empty
area in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, and shooting the ICBM
down could cause it to land on Tokyo instead.

If the ICBM has a nuclear warhead, it is quite likely that the
warhead would remain intact even if the missile is destroyed.


Bombs delivered by air give you much more warning of what's to
come and can be dealt with using air defense.
I wouldn't expect any warning at all. There was no warning
on the morning of September 11. The warning on the morning
of December 7 was bungled, and had no useful effect.


And if any get through, the enemy country would effectively
cease to exist within a half hour from our missiles.
Suppose you were the president of the US and had to respond
to a nuclear bomb detonated in Anchorage, known to have been
delivered (by whatever means) by North Korea. Would you
immediately decide to kill everyone in Pyongyang? If so, why?
How would people in South Korea react to your decision? China?
Japan? Iran? Pakistan? France? Germany? Russia?


Now, "Suit case" bombs would be the absolute worst choice for a
coordinated attack. Such an attack would have to be preplanned at
a very early date while the weapons were put in place.
Could be, but wouldn't have to be.


That would give us a lot of time to find out what's going on,
Possible, but not likely. There is an enormous amount of drug
smuggling across US borders every day that is successful despite
decades of effort to stop it.


and if that happened, the attacking country is toast.
What would you do? Order a pre-emptive destruction of Teheran
and its people? To what end? What good would that do?


Furthermore, it would be difficult to place them near our land
based retaliatory capability.
What an absurd notion! Nobody attacking the US would bother
with hitting our strategic weapons systems, except possibly to
show off that they could do such a thing. Our ICBMs would not
be a target of anyone else's nuclear weapons unless they had
warheads to spare.


While I could imagine a terrorist group, if they somehow managed
to get a nuke, attempting a single bomb terrorist attack, I can't
imagine a country going this route for a conventional attack.
It would be guaranteed suicide.
I agree with that.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis

[Jeff Root]

BTW, the "shield" will not work.
If by that you mean that it is unlikely we could build a system
that could stop all the missiles in a full scale Cold War-like
exchange, I'd agree. If by that you mean that it isn't possible
to build a system that could block a smaller scale attack, or a
substantial portion of a full scale attack, I strongly disagree.
However, such a system would require more R&D and a substantial
investment.
There is a good chance that a small-scale ICBM attack or a
substantial portion thereof could be stopped if the launch
site(s) is/are known ahead of time. Otherwise, it could take
hours or longer to determine what the launch actually is, if
it is even detected before the warhead reaches its target.
A massive attack would be far easier to identify and respond
to quickly enough to make a useful reduction in the number of
warheads reaching their targets. However, a massive attack
could be accompanied by massive numbers of decoys, which
would either require a much larger anti-missile system, or
slow the system down significantly. Decoys would not be
useful in a small-scale attack.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis

[Ilya]

How would you know that the launch was accidental, if it was launched by someone else? Would Russia call NATO and ask us to shoot down an ICBM launched accidentally, or by a nut?

If a Russian ICBM were launched without authorization, I am certain that within 15 minutes Putin would be on hot line to US President, screaming "I did not order that! PLEASE shoot it down!" To do anything else would be tantamount to starting a nuclear war.

[Cylinder]

What an absurd notion! Nobody attacking the US would botherwith hitting our strategic weapons systems, except possibly to
show off that they could do such a thing. Our ICBMs would not
be a target of anyone else's nuclear weapons unless they had
warheads to spare.

You really need to rethink that notion. First-strike targets are designed precisely to neuter an enemy's strategic forces.

[Larry Jacks]

There is a good chance that a small-scale ICBM attack or a substantial portion thereof could be stopped if the launch site(s) is/are known ahead of time. Otherwise, it could take hours or longer to determine what the launch actually is, if it is even detected before the warhead reaches its target. A massive attack would be far easier to identify and respond to quickly enough to make a useful reduction in the number of warheads reaching their targets. However, a massive attack could be accompanied by massive numbers of decoys, which would either require a much larger anti-missile system, or
slow the system down significantly. Decoys would not be useful in a small-scale attack.

You might want to read up on the Defense Support Program series of launch detection satellites. They can detect a launch very soon after it ignites and give other data about the launch (some of it is classified so I won't say more). In short, it wouldn't take hours to characterize the launch - it'd be known very quickly.

Back in the late 1940s, the US Navy launched a V-2 rocket from the deck of an aircraft carrier. According to reports I've read, Iran has also tested the idea. Several countries have developed nuclear-capable missiles (India and Pakistan are just two) with sufficient range to attack from hundreds of miles off-shore. There are some attack scenarios that could do trillions of dollars of economic damage with a single missile.

Countries like North Korea and Iran are working on long range missiles and nuclear weapons because it lets them play the nuclear blackmail card. As an example, suppose North Korea developed a successful long range missile (like the one they tested in 1998) and equips it with a nuclear warhead, even a crude one. If they had the capability, they could then threaten action against South Korea and threaten to destroy a US city (say Anchorage or Honolulu) if the US intervenes. Would a US president take the gamble of having a US city destroyed to save South Korea? On the other hand, even a limited missile defense system could negate North Korea's ability to use nuclear blackmail.

No one form of defense is good for every possible threat. Body armor can protect against a gunshot in the chest but you can bleed to death from a wound to the leg or arm if an artery is cut. Does that mean no police officer or military member should wear body armor?

Comprehensive defense looks at each threat and addresses it. Missile defense won't work against aircraft, cruise missiles, ships, or smuggled weapons. Better harbor defenses won't protect against missiles, aircraft, or cruise missles. Does that mean that harbor defense is unnecessary?

Long range missiles have been in the US and former Soviet inventories for decades. They've been tested hundreds of times. China has developed ICBMs and is working on a newer, more capable generation of missiles. Any country that has developed or is developing a space launch capability (e.g. France, Israel, India, Japan, Brazil, Iraq (http://www.spacetoday.org/Rockets/Spaceports/Iraq.html)) already has almost all of the technology to develop very long range missiles. All they really need is a reentry system and that technology is pretty widely known.

Developing effective decoys is harder than you seem to believe. An effective decoy needs to have a similar shape as a reentry vehicle (no long range missile keeps the warhead on the rocket body). That isn't all that hard - all you'd need is an cone shaped balloon. However, the decoy would also need similar ballistic characteristics and stability or it would be easily distinguishable from the real thing. That means the decoy itself becomes fairly challenging to develop. Sometimes, it's easier to just put on another warhead.

[Jeff Root]

If a Russian ICBM were launched without authorization, I am
certain that within 15 minutes Putin would be on hot line to
US President, screaming "I did not order that! PLEASE shoot
it down!"
It might take more than 15 minutes for word that an ICBM had
been launched without authorization to go up through the chain
of command to the top military leaders, who would be authorized
to contact Putin. At each level the situation would have to
be explained, questions would be asked, and supporting evidence
requested by a skeptical higher-up. Nobody will take the
problem to his boss unless he is certain the problem is real.
Putin will be in the same boat. He will not contact the US or
NATO unless he is certain that an ICBM really has been launched
and is headed toward another nation's territory, and is beyond
their own power to stop. Then it has to be explained to the US
president, probably via a translator, and he has to tell someone
else to act. You really need to hit the ICBM with your
anti-ICBM weapon within eight minutes of launch, or it will
reach the target, even if it reaches the target in pieces.

Technical information will probably be sent more quickly at
lower levels, but those people, too, will have to confirm what
they are told by their counterparts in Russia before they can
shoot something down. It depends on how people react to what
they are told, what decisions they make, and how quickly they
make those decisions. The more quickly a decision is made,
the more likely it is to be wrong.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis

[Jeff Root]

Nobody attacking the US would bother with hitting our strategic
weapons systems, except possibly to show off that they could do
such a thing. Our ICBMs would not be a target of anyone else's
nuclear weapons unless they had warheads to spare.
You really need to rethink that notion. First-strike targets
are designed precisely to neuter an enemy's strategic forces.
Re-read the exchange between Van Rijn and myself. You did not
understand what I said because you lost track of what I was
responding to.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis

[Jeff Root]

There is a good chance that a small-scale ICBM attack or a
substantial portion thereof could be stopped if the launch
site(s) is/are known ahead of time. Otherwise, it could take
hours or longer to determine what the launch actually is, if it
is even detected before the warhead reaches its target. A massive
attack would be far easier to identify and respond to quickly
enough to make a useful reduction in the number of warheads
reaching their targets. However, a massive attack could be
accompanied by massive numbers of decoys, which would either
require a much larger anti-missile system, or slow the system
down significantly. Decoys would not be useful in a small-scale
attack.
You might want to read up on the Defense Support Program series
of launch detection satellites. They can detect a launch very
soon after it ignites and give other data about the launch (some
of it is classified so I won't say more).
My guess is that you don't know anything "classified", so you
can't say more.


In short, it wouldn't take hours to characterize the launch -
it'd be known very quickly.
With only a single DSP satellite viewing any point on Earth
from geosynchronous orbit, the entire boost phase of an ICBM
may be the equivalent of only two or three pixels in the DSP
infrared imager. The scenario that I was writing about and
you responded to was a small-scale launch from an unexpected
location. That could take weeks to identify if it is not an
ICBM, and would almost certainly take minutes to identify if
it is an ICBM. Meaning that an ICBM is most likely to be
identified after the fact by its having hit a target.

If the launch site is known, then you have a reasonable chance
of identifying a launch before the boost phase has ended.


Back in the late 1940s, the US Navy launched a V-2 rocket from
the deck of an aircraft carrier. According to reports I've read,
Iran has also tested the idea. Several countries have developed
nuclear-capable missiles (India and Pakistan are just two) with
sufficient range to attack from hundreds of miles off-shore.
There are some attack scenarios that could do trillions of
dollars of economic damage with a single missile.
No disagreement with that.


Countries like North Korea and Iran are working on long range
missiles and nuclear weapons because it lets them play the
nuclear blackmail card. As an example, suppose North Korea
developed a successful long range missile (like the one they
tested in 1998) and equips it with a nuclear warhead, even a
crude one. If they had the capability, they could then threaten
action against South Korea and threaten to destroy a US city
(say Anchorage or Honolulu) if the US intervenes. Would a US
president take the gamble of having a US city destroyed to save
South Korea? On the other hand, even a limited missile defense
system could negate North Korea's ability to use nuclear
blackmail.
No it couldn't.

As I said, all a missile defense system could do would be to
destroy intercontinental missiles and satellites. It would do
nothing to stop nuclear weapons from reaching their targets.

If North Korea were to launch a nuclear weapon on a missile
aimed at Anchorage, say ten years from now, the missile might
have a 30% chance of landing close enough to Anchorage to do
major damage to the city. With an anti-missile system, either
global or purpose-built to counter an attack from North Korea,
that chance might be reduced to only 10%. Is that good?


No one form of defense is good for every possible threat.
Of course. I've never heard anyone suggest otherwise.


Body armor can protect against a gunshot in the chest but you
can bleed to death from a wound to the leg or arm if an artery
is cut. Does that mean no police officer or military member
should wear body armor?
No. But it does mean that if someone's premeditated purpose
is to kill you, body armor will not give you any protection.
Being protected against the wrong threat is not being protected.


Comprehensive defense looks at each threat and addresses it.
Missile defense won't work against aircraft, cruise missiles,
ships, or smuggled weapons. Better harbor defenses won't protect
against missiles, aircraft, or cruise missles. Does that mean
that harbor defense is unnecessary?
My opinion is that it is no better than no defense.


Long range missiles have been in the US and former Soviet
inventories for decades. They've been tested hundreds of times.
And they usually work, too. Catastrophic failures do continue
to happen, though.


China has developed ICBMs and is working on a newer, more capable
generation of missiles.
That's what I suspected, but I don't know anything about it.


Any country that has developed or is developing a space launch
capability (e.g. France, Israel, India, Japan, Brazil, Iraq)
already has almost all of the technology to develop very long
range missiles. All they really need is a reentry system and
that technology is pretty widely known.
Actually building and testing such missiles requires an awfully
large commitment of money and resources for quite a few years.
If it isn't tested, it almost certainly won't work.


Developing effective decoys is harder than you seem to believe.
An effective decoy needs to have a similar shape as a reentry
vehicle (no long range missile keeps the warhead on the rocket
body). That isn't all that hard - all you'd need is an cone
shaped balloon. However, the decoy would also need similar
ballistic characteristics and stability or it would be easily
distinguishable from the real thing. That means the decoy itself
becomes fairly challenging to develop. Sometimes, it's easier to
just put on another warhead.
As I said, decoys would only be useful in a massive attack.
And where launch capability exceeds the number of nukes you
have or the number you are willing to expend, and the opponent
has a significant anti-missile capability. The decoys should
be good enough to be indistinguishable from warheads while
still in space. If you have lots of launch capability but few
nukes you might put 50 decoys on each ICBM along with one nuke.
If they were balloons, as you suggest, then they would certainly
only work during the space segment of the flight, but you could
launch 500 of them on each ICBM.

Your point that no long-range missile keeps the warhead on the
rocket body after leaving the atmosphere is good. Hitting such
a tiny target is almost impossible unless the closing speed is
low. Getting a low closing speed is even more difficult because
it requires a huge energy expendature in a short time. AFAIK,
all missile intercept tests to date have intercepted objects
considerably larger than warhead re-entry bodies.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis

[Doodler]

If I understand correctly, there are a number of treaties that disallow multiple warheads in missiles regardless of the actual carrying capacity of the missile proper, which is fine. The most logical decoy is another warhead, kitted out to look and act like a standard warhead without the actual nuclear material.

Sure, you'll get the usual whiners complaining about redeploying multiple warhead missiles, but you can give'em the Boy Scout salute and cross your heart, hope to die, that there's only one nuke in the tube. ;)

[Jeff Root]

Any country that has developed or is developing a space launch
capability (e.g. France, Israel, India, Japan, Brazil, Iraq)
The word "Iraq" was a link:
http://www.spacetoday.org/Rockets/Spaceports/Iraq.html
with information I consider to be incorrect. It claims that
on December 5, 1989, Iraq launched "the 48-ton, third stage of
a three-stage rocket in a flight from Al-Anbar Space Research
Center 50 miles west of Baghdad to a six-orbit spaceflight."

Jane's Space Directory 1993-1994 says:

The 24 m 48 t Tamouz 1 vehicle launched from the Al Anbar
facility 80km west of Baghdad on 5 December 1989 was claimed by
the Iraqis as a satellite launcher test. Only the first of the
three stages was live, reportedly attaining 12 km altitude.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis

[ASEI]

Is that good? Come on! Reducing the probability of hundreds of thousands of people being wiped out from 30% to 10% is good even up to justifying ridiculous costs. If it's NK we're talking about, we could probably stop whatever they launch with our test program a lot better than 10%

[Larry Jacks]

My guess is that you don't know anything "classified", so you
can't say more.

Then you're wrong on that as you are wrong on missile defense. I'm a defense contractor supporting Air Force Space Command and a former Air Force officer (satellite operations) who, among other assignments, spent a year as a crew commander on the Cobra Dane intelligence radar monitoring Soviet missile tests and space launches. I hesitate to talk about things that might be classified because I'm posting under my real name and I could lose my clearance and my job. As for DSP, you can look it up and educate yourself.

As I said, all a missile defense system could do would be to destroy intercontinental missiles and satellites. It would do nothing to stop nuclear weapons from reaching their targets.

The missile defense systems are designed to kill the reentry vehicles carrying the nuclear warheads, not to hit the missile. You may be thinking of the Patriot vs. Scud situation in the first Gulf War. Scud missiles fly all of the way to their target with the warhead attached to the rocket body, unlike all ICBMs. The Patriot missiles then in use detonated their warheads a few milliseconds too late. They destroyed the rocket body but failed to detonate the warheads. Current generation Patriot PAC III missiles go for direct impact, as do the missile defense kinetic kill vehicles.

If North Korea were to launch a nuclear weapon on a missile aimed at Anchorage, say ten years from now, the missile might have a 30% chance of landing close enough to Anchorage to do major damage to the city. With an anti-missile system, either global or purpose-built to counter an attack from North Korea, that chance might be reduced to only 10%. Is that good?

You're pulling numbers out of your anal data store. Even if North Korea launched at Anchorage and had only a 30% chance of hitting the city, cutting that to 10% is certainly better than leaving the chances at 30%. In the real world, if they launched an attack, the US is prepared to launch more than one ABM if necessary. The concept is simple "shoot, look, shoot." You fire your first shot at maximum range while preparing your second shot. If the first one misses, you're ready to fire again. If you're concerned enough, you can even fire more than one ABM at a time but you have to be careful not to deplete your ABMs too quickly, leaving yourself open for a subsequent shot.

No. But it does mean that if someone's premeditated purpose is to kill you, body armor will not give you any protection. Being protected against the wrong threat is not being protected.

That's why you have to look at each threat and evaluate what is needed to protect against it. You can't just look at one threat, deem it the most likely, and ignore all of the other threats. Doing so is foolish and leaves you wide open. Defense against smuggled weapons means we need to step up harbor and border security. Defense against cruise missiles and aircraft attack requires a different set of security measures, and so does missile defense.

Your point that no long-range missile keeps the warhead on the rocket body after leaving the atmosphere is good. Hitting such a tiny target is almost impossible unless the closing speed is low. Getting a low closing speed is even more difficult because it requires a huge energy expendature in a short time. AFAIK, all missile intercept tests to date have intercepted objects
considerably larger than warhead re-entry bodies.

You're wrong again. All of the missile defense tests are against RV sized targets. The entire design is focused on hitting such small targets with the greatest possible speed, not the least as you assume. If possible, they go for a direct head on shot (greatest kinetic energy that way).

There are two missile defense sites in the US - Fort Greeley, Alaska and Vandenberg AFB, CA. While I'm not aware of the range of the ABMs, based on the flight timelines of the missile tests, it seems their range is well over 1000 miles (quite likely 3000 miles, but that's just a WAG). Take a globe and trace out a radius of 1000 miles from the two launch sites. Then, take a string and go from North Korea to various places in the US. Odds are you'll find that most of those flight lines will cross into the coverage areas of the ABMs. Now, expand the coverage area, say to 2000 miles. You'll find that even more of the US is covered. As an experiment, try running a string from the Middle East, say Iran, to the US. You'll find that most of those are covered, too. Unless Congress does something stupid like gutting missile defense again, there will likely be another ABM site somewhere on the East coast within a few years to offer even better coverage. The major expense is R&D. Once that is accomplished, fielding another site is relatively easy.

[Cylinder]

Re-read the exchange between Van Rijn and myself. You did not understand what I said because you lost track of what I was
responding to.

That's why I used a quoted section.

Nobody attacking the US would bother with hitting our strategic weapons systems, except possibly to show off that they could do such a thing. Our ICBMs would not be a target of anyone else's nuclear weapons unless they had warheads to spare.

I agree that an NGO-wielded nuclear device would hit a propoganda target over strategic sites, but you stated that "nobody" would strike those targets other than as a propaganda demonstration. That's fundamentally wrong.

There's a theory around NATO strategic airfields called "smoking hole." It means that after our first strike packages were launched, that we would go through the motions of preparing for recovery of these assets when - in reality - we would be wiped off the map very shortly after launch. When the alert aircraft returned, they would find a smoking hole where their airfield once stood.

One huge reason for the third leg (tine?) of the trident - ballistic missile submarines - is to provide a viable retaliatory platform to respond to the Soviet Union's successful first strike. Of course, another is the ability to place missile silos closer to their target - thus cutting warning time for launching ICBMs from the targeted silos and strike packages from targeted airfields.

[sarongsong]

Another exercise:December 5, 2006
The Navy is aiming for another first tomorrow when it tries simultaneously to knock down dummy ballistic and cruise missiles off the coast of Kauai...the Pearl Harbor-based cruiser Lake Erie, outfitted with the Aegis ballistic missile defense weapon system, will attempt to detect and attack... Star-Bulletin (http://starbulletin.com/2006/12/05/news/story11.html)

[Jeff Root]

My guess is that you don't know anything "classified", so you
can't say more.
Then you're wrong on that as you are wrong on missile defense.
I'm a defense contractor supporting Air Force Space Command and
a former Air Force officer (satellite operations) who, among
other assignments, spent a year as a crew commander on the
Cobra Dane intelligence radar monitoring Soviet missile tests
and space launches.
Ah. That makes things difficult for both of us.

I've met several people in various circumstances (some of them
at space development conferences, others just by chance) who
worked on Kwajalein Island or in strategic defense, but I never
got past a general synopsis of what they did, nor did I ask for
anything more. A friend of a friend, who's job it was to put a
key in a keyswitch and turn it, if asked to do so, paused a
surprisingly long time before answering even the most innocuous
questions. He said that it was an acquired behavior.


I hesitate to talk about things that might be classified because I'm
posting under my real name and I could lose my clearance and my job.
Whether posting under your real name or not, I don't want to
push you toward territory where you shouldn't go.


As for DSP, you can look it up and educate yourself.
The most interesting facts are the space and time resolutions
of the detectors. Apparently there are three satellites active
at any time, in geosynch orbit, so usually only one DSP sees an
event. My understanding is that there are 6000 IR sensors in
the array. The whole sat rotates six times per minute to sweep
the Earth, so effectively a frame every ten seconds. At that
distance and with that number of sensors, I'd expect a typical
missile to make a track which is effectively two or three pixels
long, localizeable to within +/- 5 km (a fraction of a pixel).
Of course, the bigger the missile, the bigger the track. The
Space Shuttle must be easy to detect.


As I said, all a missile defense system could do would be to
destroy intercontinental missiles and satellites. It would do
nothing to stop nuclear weapons from reaching their targets.
The missile defense systems are designed to kill the reentry
vehicles carrying the nuclear warheads, not to hit the missile.
You may be thinking of the Patriot vs. Scud situation in the
first Gulf War. Scud missiles fly all of the way to their target
with the warhead attached to the rocket body, unlike all ICBMs.
The Patriot missiles then in use detonated their warheads a few
milliseconds too late. They destroyed the rocket body but failed
to detonate the warheads. Current generation Patriot PAC III
missiles go for direct impact, as do the missile defense kinetic
kill vehicles.
One person I talked with face-to-face, though briefly, was USAF
General Daniel Graham, principle exponent of Brilliant Pebbles.
I have at least a superficial familiarity with the concept.
That was many years ago, though, and I haven't kept up with
recent developments.


If North Korea were to launch a nuclear weapon on a missile aimed
at Anchorage, say ten years from now, the missile might have a
30% chance of landing close enough to Anchorage to do major
damage to the city. With an anti-missile system, either global or
purpose-built to counter an attack from North Korea, that chance
might be reduced to only 10%. Is that good?
You're pulling numbers out of your anal data store.
Out of the air. I think the numbers are about as good as anyone
is likely to come up with at this time. Can you provide better?


Even if North Korea launched at Anchorage and had only a 30%
chance of hitting the city, cutting that to 10% is certainly
better than leaving the chances at 30%.
I'm not going to disagree with that. I'm not going to agree
with it, either. There are many factors not mentioned in that
scenario which affect my opinion of what is "good" or "bad",
and I don't want to give a wrong impression by stating an
opinion in the absence of an accounting of those factors.


In the real world, if they launched an attack, the US is prepared
to launch more than one ABM if necessary. The concept is simple
"shoot, look, shoot." You fire your first shot at maximum range
while preparing your second shot. If the first one misses, you're
ready to fire again. If you're concerned enough, you can even
fire more than one ABM at a time but you have to be careful not
to deplete your ABMs too quickly, leaving yourself open for a
subsequent shot.
That is almost exactly what I assumed in making up those toy
numbers. I assumed that the resources of the entire ABM system
would be available to shoot down the one ICBM from Korea, and
that the system would be adaptive.

I also assumed that the warhead separates from the booster and
is either a cone a meter long and half a meter in diameter,
with no trajectory control, or is about twice that volume and
has some trajectory control while in space, similar to but less
capable than that of the vehicles which are going after it.
I assumed that the ABM vehicles can see but that the warhead is
blind. Any trajectory control would just impart random, sudden
motions to the warhead to make it harder to hit.


Being protected against the wrong threat is not being protected.
That's why you have to look at each threat and evaluate what is
needed to protect against it. You can't just look at one threat,
deem it the most likely, and ignore all of the other threats.
Doing so is foolish and leaves you wide open. Defense against
smuggled weapons means we need to step up harbor and border
security. Defense against cruise missiles and aircraft attack
requires a different set of security measures, and so does
missile defense.
Yes. Since October 1982, when the Strategic Defense Initiative
was first publicly described, the enormous range of measures
that would be required has been what concerns and worries me
more than anything else. If it appears that the extremely
difficult, expensive, unreliable, and slow-to-implement means
of delivering nuclear weapons by ICBM might be successfully
blocked by an ABM system, then far easier, less expensive, more
reliable, and rapidly-implemented means will be considered.
It is the very broad range of measures required to deal with
those numerous easier means which worry me.

Developing an ABM system increases the likelyhood that the US
will be attacked by means of delivery systems which are harder
to intercept and far easier to obtain and use than ICBMs. We
have already seen non-nuclear examples of that.


Your point that no long-range missile keeps the warhead on the
rocket body after leaving the atmosphere is good. Hitting such a
tiny target is almost impossible unless the closing speed is low.
Getting a low closing speed is even more difficult because it
requires a huge energy expendature in a short time. AFAIK, all
missile intercept tests to date have intercepted objects
considerably larger than warhead re-entry bodies.
You're wrong again. All of the missile defense tests are against
RV sized targets.
That may be true. I find it hard to believe.


The entire design is focused on hitting such small targets with
the greatest possible speed, not the least as you assume. If
possible, they go for a direct head on shot (greatest kinetic
energy that way).
I did not assume that they attempt to match speed, nor did I
imply it in what I said. I said that it is almost imossible to
hit such a tiny target unless the closing speed is low. That
is relevant because the closing speed is very high-- typically
5 to 10 kilometers per second, but possibly as high as 16 kps
in the head-on case you suggest.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis

[Larry Jacks]

The most interesting facts are the space and time resolutions of the detectors. Apparently there are three satellites active at any time, in geosynch orbit, so usually only one DSP sees an event. My understanding is that there are 6000 IR sensors in the array. The whole sat rotates six times per minute to sweep the Earth, so effectively a frame every ten seconds. At that distance and with that number of sensors, I'd expect a typical missile to make a track which is effectively two or three pixels long, localizeable to within +/- 5 km (a fraction of a pixel). Of course, the bigger the missile, the bigger the track. The Space Shuttle must be easy to detect.

The boost phase for a missile typically lasts for several minutes. After all, the velocity required to achieve ICBM range is not much less than to achieve orbit (it's very close, with the primary difference being the trajectory more than velocity). At a rotation speed of 6 RPM, that means the DSP will sweep the missile's exhaust plume once every 10 seconds. If the missile's burn time is 3 minutes (and most a considerably longer), then that's 18 hits. Given that there are at least 3 DSP satellites (and there may be more), then there is good launch detection coverage. The replacement system for DSP is already in development and a test sensor package is already in orbit. Called SIBRS, it uses a staring system instead of a scanning system. This makes it much more accurate with higher resolution and continuous tracking data.

DSP data is basically two dimensional with time tags. It can give very early launch detection and initial tracking information. For the actual intercept, they use data from BMEWS and/or PAVE PAWS radars (very long range phased array radars located in Alaska, Greenland, the UK, California, and Cape Cod) along with data from new X-band radars and AEGIS ship-based radars. These radars give highly accurate 3D data (especially the X-band units) and are capable of tracking many objects at the same time. They also have the ability to perform first-order target discrimination (e.g. debris and rocket body parts from warheads). These data are used to aim the interceptor missiles. The guidance systems on the kinetic kill vehicles use on-board systems to perform the final target discrimination and home in on the target. These systems have been in development for well over 20 years and are amazing pieces of technology. They're making them even smaller with the intention of putting multiple kill vehicles on each ABM booster. Instead of one ABM missile going after one warhead (and having to pick that out of a collection of decoys), one ABM will be able to carry multiple kill vehicles with each one aimed at a different warhead and/or decoy. That simplifies the challenge of discriminating the warhead from decoys considerably.

The whole concept of kinetic kill depends on achieving a high closing speed. The last thing you'd want to do is try to catch a target from behind. The best thing is a direct head on attack if possible. ICBMs generally have two or three rocket stages then a post-boost vehicle (sometimes called the bus) that carries the guidance system, the warheads and decoys, and a small liquid-fueled rocket motor. The purpose of the bus is to precisely adjust the warhead's velocity vector to hit the target, then to release the warhead. For multiple warheads (MIRVs), the bus will perform a series of maneuvers to put each warhead on the desired trajectory. Once the warhead is released from the bus, it can't maneuver any more. It's course is set. The only way to achieve a maneuvering warhead capability (as claimed for the SS-27 Russian ICBM) would be to have the warhead stay attached to the bus for a longer period or for the warhead to have an integral bus capability. This could make the warhead harder to intercept, assuming it can maneuver to dodge the ABM and still have the ability to get back on the correct trajectory to hit the target. At the same time, this makes the RV larger and the thruster firings would increase the IR signature, making it easier to track with the kill vehicle. Such technology is challenging to develop. Russia has the technology and skill to achieve it. So do we if we see the need. Not many other countries could pull it off. Like I posted before, even developing good decoys is harder than most people believe.

Developing an ABM system increases the likelyhood that the US will be attacked by means of delivery systems which are harder to intercept and far easier to obtain and use than ICBMs. We have already seen non-nuclear examples of that.

I don't see how developing a defense system makes us more likely to be attacked at all. Leaving ourself defenseless against long range missiles doesn't make us safer. If someone is bent on attacking the US with nuclear weapons, they're going to use whatever means they have at their disposal. Several countries not friendly to the US are developing long range missile capabilities. That suggests they see political and/or military utility in these weapons (more politcal than military, IMO, for reasons of nuclear blackmail). At the same time, we have to address potential vulnerabilities to other forms of attack. It won't be easy and it certainly won't be cheap, but we need to address as many different vulnerabilities as we can. That includes vulnerability to missile attack. Like I posted before, a country doesn't need an ICBM to attack the US with a missile. If the US could launch a V-2 (with a range of about 200 miles) off of a ship 60 years ago, then several countries have the ability to attack the US in a similar manner today. Even the lowly Scud (basically a modernized V-2 with nuclear capability) could do the job.

[Dragon Star]

This thread must have set some sort of record for most consecutive HUGE posts.

[sarongsong]

Another exercise:After a 2-day postponement:December 8, 2006
...While the target missiles were launched, a problem with the fire control system caused by an improper configuration of the system aboard the Erie kept the first interceptor missile from being launched, the missile agency said. Since the objective was to destroy both missiles nearly simultaneously, the ship intentionally did not fire the second missile, the [Missile Defense] agency said...It's the second time in nine tries that the cruiser has failed to intercept the missiles, and it was the first test to try to intercept two targets in the air at the same time... Star-Bulletin (http://starbulletin.com/2006/12/08/news/story06.html)

[Launch window]

Star Wars part 2,


http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/06/9240AF22-209A-471A-BC60-35AB199A2BCF.html
U.S. President George W. Bush has arrived in Prague for a visit aimed at convincing the Czech government to accept the installation of a U.S. radar base.

The radar would be part of a proposed anti-missile system in the Czech Republic and neighboring Poland. Russia has said it considers the proposed missile-defense system a threat to its security.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said in Moscow that if the U.S. missile-defense plan goes forward, Russia could retaliate by pointing its missiles at targets in Europe.

"If a new missile-defense system will be deployed in Europe, then we need to warn you today that we will come with a response," Putin said. "We have to ensure our security, and we are not the initiator of this process."



the Soviet bear is getting angry

Anyhow, I hope Putin can finally understand America's need to have a shield to defend from potential Iranian and NKorean missiles

Although I'm not sure how effective an ABM system in Poland would be, I'd prefer an anti-missile system much closer to Iran and NKorea

[Maksutov]

Star Wars part 2, the Soviet bear is getting angry

Anyhow, I hope Putin can finally understand America's need to have a shield to defend from potential Iranian and NKorean missiles

Although I'm not sure how effective an ABM system in Poland would be, I'd prefer an anti-missile system much closer to Iran and NKoreaIt's the same defective assumption as the original "Star Wars" rationale. It assumes ICBMs. But cruise missiles and short-range missiles launched from offshore subs or mobile launchers would get in under it.

Just a complete waste of money to feed the military-industrial complex Eisenhower (of all people) warned against (http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/%7Ehst306/documents/indust.html).

Come on, January 20, 2009. I just hope the Cold War hasn't resumed prior to then.

That's all I have to say, as this is bound to become too political.

[Larry Jacks]

They're working on cruise missile defense as a separate program. Of course, that system would be completely useless against ballistic missiles. So, by your "reasoning", we shouldn't do that, either.

[Maksutov]

They're working on cruise missile defense as a separate program. Of course, that system would be completely useless against ballistic missiles. So, by your "reasoning", we shouldn't do that, either.Who are they and what is it?

Meanwhile you've left short-range sub/mobile launcher missiles wide open.

Rh8 Ka8 7.Rxc8.

[korjik]

The Russians are rattling sabres to get political consessions. They know full well that the current ABM systems that the USA is making couldnt stop a full scale nuclear war.

I think the main reason that no one is really contemplating anti-sub launched defence is that the current antimissile systems are designed to defend against a limited nuclear launch by a rogue state. Since the current crop of rogue states have long range ballistic missiles, and no long range cruise missiles, and no deep water cruise missile subs, dosent it make sense that the current system is ABM?

[Larry Jacks]

Who are they and what is it?

The program is called "Homeland Air and Cruise Missile Defense of North America (http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,110199,00.html)" or HACMD. It's in the early stages of requirements development and concept definition.

Meanwhile you've left short-range sub/mobile launcher missiles wide open.

Things are being addressed at different levels by different programs. Just as tanks make lousy boats and anti-aircraft weapons, no one program can address every possible threat. It takes a range of projects (with minimal overlap) to address everything.

[publiusr]

Putin needs to calm down. What was Polyus after all?

[Cylinder]

Who are they and what is it?

Meanwhile you've left short-range sub/mobile launcher missiles wide open.

Rh8 Ka8 7.Rxc8.

Google JLENS. The US already has first generation operational missile defense systems against ALCMs and SLCMs such as the AMRAM, PAC-GEM/PAC-3 (follow-ons to the PATRIOT ABM) and the Navy's SM-2.

The US Army is also working on an artillery-based defense system against FROGs.

[Cylinder]

Things are being addressed at different levels by different programs. Just as tanks make lousy boats and anti-aircraft weapons, no one program can address every possible threat. It takes a range of projects (with minimal overlap) to address everything.

Good analogy...

From my understanding, ICBMs are easy to see/hard to shoot in their boost phase and hard to see/hard to shoot in their terminal phase. Cruise missiles are somewhat hard to see (because of terrain masking) but relatively easy to intercept.

The problem with SRBMs is one mainly of infrastructure now - definitely easy to see/easy to shoot.

[Maksutov]

Good analogy...

From my understanding, ICBMs are easy to see/hard to shoot in their boost phase and hard to see/hard to shoot in their terminal phase. Cruise missiles are somewhat hard to see (because of terrain masking) but relatively easy to intercept.

The problem with SRBMs is one mainly of infrastructure now - definitely easy to see/easy to shoot.Very impressive. Although your assumptions are shaky.

But there's a world of difference systematically between "working on" and "fully tested, found effective, and now deployed".

[low Mak voice, with audible breathing]Don't let these proposed technological terrors blind you to the current power of the proved forces, deployed or about to be.[/low Mak voice, with audible breathing]

[Larry Jacks]

I guess you've never heard of THAAD, the SM-3, or the SM-6. THAAD is either operational or close to it. The SM-3 has tested very well. The SM-6 is in development. All of these systems are designed to take out SRBMs. An Aegis cruiser has successfully shot down a cruise missile with an SM-2 and a ballistic missile with an SM-3 at the same time. Do try to keep up.

[Jeff Root]

They work if the launch location or the approximate flight path
is known in advance, and if it is known in advance that an attack
is coming. Otherwise you just do a KAL 007 and apologise, do
another KAL 007 and apologise again, do another KAL 007 and
apologise again... Meanwhile, your enemy isn't even thinking of
using SRBMs or cruise missiles. Too expensive, too unreliable,
too much support infrastructure, and totally unnecessary.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis

[Launch window]

Sputnik's warning
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-op-brzezinski30sep30,0,5535326.story?coll=la-home-commentary
Moscow got to space first to display military might in the face of U.S. provocation. Fifty years later, it's a point well taken.

[mugaliens]

My question is : does the shield really work ?

Partly. Patriot (http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/congress/1992_h/h920407h.htm)really works.

But it's an anti-tactical system. It's an area-defense weapon. It's not designed to protect against MIRVs.

If you have more questions, you're going to have to Google or Wikipedia it.

Good luck!

[mugaliens]

You really need to rethink that notion. First-strike targets are designed precisely to neuter an enemy's strategic forces.

Actually, cylinder, I think he's dead on target.

Original post:

Originally Posted by Jeff Root
What an absurd notion! Nobody attacking the US would botherwith hitting our strategic weapons systems, except possibly to
show off that they could do such a thing. Our ICBMs would not
be a target of anyone else's nuclear weapons unless they had
warheads to spare.

Well said, Jeff.

The rest of you are thinking back in the 1960s.

If another country didn't have enough warheads to take out ours, there'd be nothing left of the other country. No sane country would ever try to first-strike the US unless they could outnumber us because the cost to them would be death by glowing, smoking, nuclear hole. Plural.

I suspect it's why Kim Jong Ill recently capitulated. I'm sorry he doesn't understand the difference between "loosing face" and reality. His problem. Not mine.

If you think things have changed since the cold war, think again. Our capability to ascertain who might have launched what against us is so far beyond the "is WHOPR doing it or is it real?" Matthew Broderick/Ally Sheedy War Games era it's not even funny. We have the edge six ways to Sunday, sunny-side up and funny-side down.

As to whether we'd ever use it, I'm not a spokesman for the National Security Agencies so I'll shut up, now, and let them speak for themselves, as they're quite capable of doing.

[mugaliens]

[I]There is a good chance... ...Sometimes, it's easier to just put on another warhead.

Pretty dang good analysis, Larry!

[mugaliens]

I guess you've never heard of THAAD, the SM-3, or the SM-6. THAAD is either operational or close to it. The SM-3 has tested very well. The SM-6 is in development. All of these systems are designed to take out SRBMs. An Aegis cruiser has successfully shot down a cruise missile with an SM-2 and a ballistic missile with an SM-3 at the same time. Do try to keep up.

Cudos.

Sorry, Jeff Root, but your later meanderings don't match with what we know to be true today. As Larry said, please do try to keep up.

If you're still living in the 1980s, please bow out.

[RalofTyr]

No, the missile defense system doesn't work.

But it does keep us feeling safe that in the utterly unplausable event that a nation launches one missile at a us, we are prepared, sort of....

[Larry Jacks]

No, the missile defense system doesn't work.

No, the tests just keep hitting the target time after time. Other than that, it must be a failure because so many keep saying so.

[The_Radiation_Specialist]

If another country didn't have enough warheads to take out ours, there'd be nothing left of the other country. No sane country would ever try to first-strike the US unless they could outnumber us because the cost to them would be death by glowing, smoking, nuclear hole. Plural.



Whats the protocol in these circumstances? If North Korea dropped a nuclear bomb on a major US. city (assuming they got through the system) would the US retaliate by bombing N. Korea back to stone age?

[Larry Jacks]

Whats the protocol in these circumstances? If North Korea dropped a nuclear bomb on a major US. city (assuming they got through the system) would the US retaliate by bombing N. Korea back to stone age?

It depends on who is President at the time. Quite likely, yes, we would inflict massive retailiation on them. It wouldn't take too many bombs to put North Korea back into the stone age - over 60 years of communist rule has pretty well taken care of that already. I suspect that any US president who let someone destroy a city (and thousands of lives) and did nothing in return wouldn't be in office very long.

[The_Radiation_Specialist]

It depends on who is President at the time. Quite likely, yes, we would inflict massive retailiation on them. It wouldn't take too many bombs to put North Korea back into the stone age - over 60 years of communist rule has pretty well taken care of that already. I suspect that any US president who let someone destroy a city (and thousands of lives) and did nothing in return wouldn't be in office very long.

This is an interesting issue. The majority I would assume would think that retaliation is the best action to take. But some may think otherwise. What good would it be to kill millions of innocent North Koreans because some one up in the N. Korean office pressed the button? Would it cause a collapse of the regime?

[korjik]

This is an interesting issue. The majority I would assume would think that retaliation is the best action to take. But some may think otherwise. What good would it be to kill millions of innocent North Koreans because some one up in the N. Korean office pressed the button? Would it cause a collapse of the regime?

I doubt it would be as simple as they bombed us so we bomb them. I doubt there are many who would want to massacre the NK civvies just cause the nuts in charge pulled the trigger. That would mean an invasion. That would lead to finding out who your friends really are.

Unfortunately, I think that is getting into politics.

[Van Rijn]

Whats the protocol in these circumstances? If North Korea dropped a nuclear bomb on a major US. city (assuming they got through the system) would the US retaliate by bombing N. Korea back to stone age?

If they used ICBMs and if there was any suspicion that they had more they could launch, my bet is that those would be taken out ASAP. I'm not sure about civilian targets, but non-nuclear military assets would also be likely targets.

[RalofTyr]

There's nothing to worry about. 99 times out of 100, a dictator's sole existence is to keep his power. Launching missiles at a superpower reduces that chance significantly.

Even if NK's regime collapsed and Al-Qaeda elements took control of the government (please don't laugh too much) and launched at the US, we'd have a 50/50 chance of hitting one missile. If they have two, the odds are reduced.

The best Missile defense system is for every nuclear missile an enemy nation has, like Russia, we have three missile defense systems.

The more and more I think of missile defense, the more and more I think of Military Industrial Complex and funding.

And one MRV ICBM can cause problems with missile defense.

Still, MAD is the best policy when it comes to nuclear deterance, so far, but it's not a good one.

Also, the United States would look very bad if say, the retaliated and killed millions of innocent people in a small third world nation whose government chose to attack the US.

[Larry Jacks]

Even if NK's regime collapsed and Al-Qaeda elements took control of the government (please don't laugh too much) and launched at the US, we'd have a 50/50 chance of hitting one missile. If they have two, the odds are reduced.

And where precisely do you get your 50/50 number? It sounds rather like you pulled it from an anal data store.

[Ronald Brak]

It's easy to get fixated on an anti-missile's chances to knock something out of the sky. But its overall purpose is to protect people and its opportunity cost should be considered. Are there other areas where the money could be spent that would provide people with greater protection? If there are then a missile defence could be 100% effective but still be an inefficient allocation of resources.

[Ilya]

It's easy to get fixated on an anti-missile's chances to knock something out of the sky. But its overall purpose is to protect people and its opportunity cost should be considered. Are there other areas where the money could be spent that would provide people with greater protection? If there are then a missile defence could be 100% effective but still be an inefficient allocation of resources.

And vice versa. Say, a given missile shield has only 20% chance of stopping an ICBM. Sounds terrible, right? Yet 20% chance of preventing $1 trillion of damage is equivalent to $200 billion return on the investment. Which may well be worth pursuing.

[Ronald Brak]

I'm trying to work out how to vice versa my comment and I can't do it. It's a conditional statement. Opportunity costs is about what you could do with your funds if you spent them on something else. For example let's say roll bars, air bags and seat belts all give the same amount of protection but air bags cost twice as much as seat belts or roll bars. Assuming all else is equal, it would be inefficient to spend all your money on just air bags when with the same money you could afford both seatbelts and roll bars and get double the protection. By buying air bags you would forgo the opportunity to buy both seat belts and roll bars. Of course if you had more money you could get all three for even more protection, but generally people have to work within a budget and must weigh up their opportunity costs.

[CodeSlinger]

Say, a given missile shield has only 20% chance of stopping an ICBM. Sounds terrible, right? Yet 20% chance of preventing $1 trillion of damage is equivalent to $200 billion return on the investment. Which may well be worth pursuing.

This is only true if there is a 100% chance that we will be attacked by ICBM's. If there is only 50% chance of us being attacked, then it's only a $100 billion return. Investments (of money, time, and/or energy) elsewhere to reduce the likelihood of us being attacked in the first place may be a better investment than spendings on a missile shield.

But I'm probably straying too close to politics now.

[Larry Jacks]

As I've written before, the real utility for an ABM is against a marginal nuclear power (or would be nuclear power), not against a major power like Russia. Russia has way too many missiles to stop with any realistic form of ABM system. China doesn't have nearly so many missiles as Russia but they're expanding their arsenal, so it might not be possible to completely stop them, either. Even in the worst days of the Cold War, we could count on the rationality of the Soviet leaders.

North Korea is apparently backing away from their nuclear program (a very good thing) but it appears Iran isn't. Both countries are ruled by people that could easily be considered as unstable. If either of them had a long range nuclear missile capability - even if it was only a handful of weapons - then they could use them as a form of nuclear blackmail to cover some expansionist action. For example, suppose North Korea had nuclear weapons and a way to deliver them. If they made a move against South Korea and had the ability to threaten the US or Japan, would we act to stop them? Even though we have more than enough weapons to melt those countries into glass, we'd have to face the possibility of suffering untold thousands of casualties at horrific expense.

On the other hand, if we had the means to negate their nuclear capability, then it might make them less like to attack their neighbor. Clearly, IMO, being defenseless against an unstable opponent isn't a wise policy.

[Launch window]

Japan intercepts missile in space from ship off Hawaii
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2007/Dec/17/br/br6701934825.html

[Maksutov]

No, the missile defense system doesn't work.

No, the tests just keep hitting the target time after time. Other than that, it must be a failure because so many keep saying so.There's a huge difference between a series of successful tests (I notice you didn't mention the numerous failures) and an operational system. Just ask NASA about the STS.

Meanwhile, once again, the whole "missile defense shield" is predicated on the assumption that all we need to guard against is ICBMs. Think Maginot Line (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maginot_Line).

Yet another boondoggle along the lines of Ronnie's "Star Wars".

[Maksutov]

Partly. Patriot (http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/congress/1992_h/h920407h.htm)really works....Only as long as it, having been designed as a surface to air anti-aircraft system, is trying to hit those slugs called Scuds, which move just a little faster than Blackbirds.

It was a Patriot that missed a Scud back in 1991 that impacted on an Army barracks, resulting in 28 deaths and 100+ injuries. Videos show that the Scud was probably deflected by the errant Patriot explosion.

The history of the Patriot missile in the Gulf is less than sterling. (http://www.counterpunch.org/stclair04172003.html)

[ASEI]

I wonder why no one (except maybe the Russians) considers using nuclear weapons to intercept incoming nuclear missiles. You wouldn't have to be close at all to get a kill on an incoming warhead, MIRVs, decoys and all. And it's basically just a retargeted ICBM with an upgraded guidance system.

Sure, it'll fry any sattelites that may be flying overhead, or radar antennae under the interception point, but given the choice between them and a few cities on the ground, one radically outweighs the other, IMO.

[Jens]

This has probably be addressed before, but what about the likelihood that an enemy would just launch 100 cheap ballistic missiles, with only one or two armed with a live warhead. Would we be able to know ahead of time which are the real ones? If not, it would require the launch of hundreds of anti-missile missiles, and I'm certain that would be prohibitively expensive.

[Celestial Mechanic]

It should work as long as a transvestite in mesh stockings and high heels puts his leg on the lever that reads "Triple Strength Missle Defense System" before pulling it.

:D

[Larry Jacks]

Meanwhile, once again, the whole "missile defense shield" is predicated on the assumption that all we need to guard against is ICBMs. Think Maginot Line.

Missile defense is based on the idea that you need to guard against missiles. Anti-aircraft defense is based on the idea that you need to guard against aircraft. Harbor defense is based on the idea that you need to guard against smuggled things that could harm you. You fixate on missile defense without seeing that it's part of a bigger defensive construct. ICBM missile defense won't work against container ships. Inspecting containers won't stop a missile or an airplane. Do you lock the front door only to leave the back door wide open?

Only as long as it, having been designed as a surface to air anti-aircraft system, is trying to hit those slugs called Scuds, which move just a little faster than Blackbirds.

It was a Patriot that missed a Scud back in 1991 that impacted on an Army barracks, resulting in 28 deaths and 100+ injuries. Videos show that the Scud was probably deflected by the errant Patriot explosion

Do you honestly think that missile hasn't changed since 1991? That was almost 17 years ago. They learned a lot from Desert Storm including what worked and what didn't. They also developed the PAC III which is a completely different missile with longer range and kinetic hit to kill capability.

I wonder why no one (except maybe the Russians) considers using nuclear weapons to intercept incoming nuclear missiles. You wouldn't have to be close at all to get a kill on an incoming warhead, MIRVs, decoys and all. And it's basically just a retargeted ICBM with an upgraded guidance system.

Sure, it'll fry any sattelites that may be flying overhead, or radar antennae under the interception point, but given the choice between them and a few cities on the ground, one radically outweighs the other, IMO.

It'd do a lot more than fry satellites. Detonating nuclear weapons in space will cause severe electromagnetic pulses (EMP) that will destroy a lot of electronics on the ground, too. The US's early ABM system was called Safeguard. The Sprint and Spartan missiles used in Safeguard were nuclear armed. They would've done a lot of damage to US systems like the electrical power grid and things connected to it. Kinetic kill is much harder but it doesn't take out your own infrastructure.

This has probably be addressed before, but what about the likelihood that an enemy would just launch 100 cheap ballistic missiles, with only one or two armed with a live warhead. Would we be able to know ahead of time which are the real ones? If not, it would require the launch of hundreds of anti-missile missiles, and I'm certain that would be prohibitively expensive.

One problem with the idea is that missiles aren't 100% effective. You don't know which missiles will actually make it to the target. It'd be better to arm all of the missiles and hope to overwhelm the defenses. Any defensive system will have its limits. What the US is building could easily be overwhelmed by Russia (we know it and Russia knows it - which makes Putin's objections suspect).

[ASEI]

Right, but once you have the ability to destroy your enemy 10x over, it doesn't make sense to reserve all future warheads for attack. Then it would make sense to work on defensive missiles. (Of course, if your enemy started building his own defensive system, you would have to build more attack missiles, but that's just par for the course in military arms races).

And whatever an emp from an interceptor does to the electrical grid, it's a lot more benign than what a direct strike would do to everything, including the electrical grid.

Suppose the following scenario:

Country A has all attack missiles and the ability to destroy country B 10x over
Country B has just as many missiles, but only enough to destroy country A 1x over allocated for attack, and the other 90% for defense.

If country A tried to attack country B, country B would launch it's counter-attack, along with its defender missiles. The defender missiles would put up a nasty barrage in orbit over it's far border, frying antennae and unshielded electronics over about half the country. But few of its cities or launch bases would be destroyed.

Country A on the other hand is going to be completely hosed after round 1. Even assuming it kept half its missiles in reserve, and some of those survived and are launched with the intent of hitting the blacked out region of country B, there are steps country B can take for its military communications and sensors.

Country B could have hardened radars with fuses and relays that disconnect the antennae from the electronics during an overload. They could then deploy new antennae. They could shield their response computers and bases from EMP by having them inside metal buildings with short, fused outside electrical loops. They could keep gas generators on standby.

The civilian electrical grid might be messed up in country B, but the whole population, infrastructure, and civilization are practically erased in country A.

[Extravoice]

I wonder why no one (except maybe the Russians) considers using nuclear weapons to intercept incoming nuclear missiles. You wouldn't have to be close at all to get a kill on an incoming warhead, MIRVs, decoys and all. And it's basically just a retargeted ICBM with an upgraded guidance system.

Sure, it'll fry any sattelites that may be flying overhead, or radar antennae under the interception point, but given the choice between them and a few cities on the ground, one radically outweighs the other, IMO.


Although it was intended for aircraft rather than missiles, I grew up with several of these puppies in my town.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nike_Hercules

I'm not sure why nukes are not currently considered for the aforementioned role. Perhaps they would not be particularly effective above the atmosphere, or kinetic weapons would work just as well, or maybe they are not politically feisable given the ABM treaty or public sentiment.

[DyerWolf]

The body armor an infantryman wears doesn't prevent him from being shot. It also only protects his trunk, and leaves his arms and legs exposed. Despite this, wearing body armor can save his life.

Its true:

Body armor is expensive (both in dollars and in terms of physical discomfort)
Not every infantryman wears body armor
Not every infantryman will be shot

But if you were going to be one of those infantrymen who end up being shot, wouldn't you also want to be one of the ones wearing body armor as well?

The missile defense shield will not prevent us from being attacked. Nor will it protect us from every attack.

But if it can protect certain key areas from some attacks, the partial defense is better than no defense at all.

[Jens]

I was wondering, what would happen if a country launched a hundred cheap missiles, with nuclear warheads on only a few of them. Would it be possible to know which are the live ones and which are the decoys? If not, it would seem fairly easy to overwhelm the system.

[ASEI]

I'm not sure a ballistic missile would qualify as cheap enough, or easy enough to mass produce. Anyone with that capability should also be capable of producing comparable numbers of warheads. I think most decoys are relatively light-weight things in the payload section of a missile delivering a warhead. (Things like inflatable tin-foil bags, ect).

[Jens]

Apparently a SCUD missile costs from 300,000 to 500,000 dollars. You'd also have to count in the launchers, so I suppose it wouldn't be that cheap. But 50 million dollars for 100 of the things doesn't seem impossible as a sum.

[korjik]

Apparently a SCUD missile costs from 300,000 to 500,000 dollars. You'd also have to count in the launchers, so I suppose it wouldn't be that cheap. But 50 million dollars for 100 of the things doesn't seem impossible as a sum.

SCUDs are a step or two smaller than the missiles intended to get picked off by any missile defence. Plus, the Iraqi's pretty much proved that they are a pretty crappy weapon system.

The missile defence that the US is putting into operation is more intended for longer range missiles that would cost quite a bit more each.

[Jeff Root]

The body armor an infantryman wears doesn't prevent him from being shot.
It also only protects his trunk, and leaves his arms and legs exposed.
Despite this, wearing body armor can save his life.

Its true:

Body armor is expensive (both in dollars and in terms of physical discomfort)
Not every infantryman wears body armor
Not every infantryman will be shot

But if you were going to be one of those infantrymen who end up being
shot, wouldn't you also want to be one of the ones wearing body armor
as well?

The missile defense shield will not prevent us from being attacked.
Nor will it protect us from every attack.

But if it can protect certain key areas from some attacks, the partial
defense is better than no defense at all.
What if wearing body armor causes 15 people to shoot at you a
total of 58 times, while not wearing body armor does not cause
anyone to shoot at you?

In that case, I would much rather not be wearing body armor.

As far as I know, I've never been shot at. I've certainly never
been hit.

My grandfather was almost hit by shrapnel in World War 1, but
he happened to lower his head at just the right moment, and the
shrapnel passed through his metal helmet from the inside to
the outside, instead of passing from the outside into his head.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis

[ASEI]

What if wearing body armor causes 15 people to shoot at you a
total of 58 times, while not wearing body armor does not cause
anyone to shoot at you?

Typically, people shooting at you have ulterior motives for doing so, and would be doing it anyway. I think the same reasoning applies to the use of nuclear weapons.

[DyerWolf]

Jeff - you are really mixing up cause and effect (and actually, failing to recognize the independent motivation/action of the shooter).

Being able to defend yourself is not provacative. But it does make people think twice about attacking you.

@ Jens - the swarm attack you describe (most likely done with dummy MIRVs) is one planned counter-response to a missile defense shield. The shield isn't perfect - there is no 100% solution - but for my money, any defense is better than nothing.

The best thing is to develop a world that is so economically interdependant that nuclear war is unthinkable - because of the rational self-interest of those who would only break their own nest eggs by throwing rocks in the first place.

The problem is that rather than seeing an increase in free-market globalism, there seems to be an increase in mercantilstic policies and practices benefitting nationalistic programs.

That is something to worry about...

[Larry Jacks]

If missile defense is so impossible, you have to wonder why so many successful tests are taking place and not just by the US. For example, in just the last week, India (http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Nuclear_India_moves_closer_to_missile_defence_shie ld_999.html) and Japan (http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Japan_Test_Fires_Its_First_Raytheon_Built_Standard _Missile_3_999.html) conducted successful ABM tests. India's test was even more impressive because they developed the system themselves while Japan launched a US developed SM-3 missile. Also, Israel (http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Israel_test_fires_improved_Patriot_missile_999.htm l) conducted a successful test of a Patriot PAC-III operating against an aircraft but also capable of hitting short range missiles. Israel also have successfully tested their Arrow (http://www.spacewar.com/reports/New_Test_Of_Israel_Anti_Missile_System_999.html) ABM (capable of intercepting longer ranged missiles than the Patriot PAC III) twice this year.

[Noclevername]

If missile defense is so impossible, you have to wonder why so many successful tests are taking place and not just by the US.

As has been pointed out, a test under controlled conditions is very different from actual use under the conditions they're meant for. There's just no way to field-test these puppies.

[Larry Jacks]

Actually, the US did some real world field testing in 2003 during the invasion of Iraq by successfully shooting down several short ranged missiles.

The purpose of testing is to gradually increase the complexity and look for things that break. You fix those things and retest. Just as you don't take a new fighter prototype into a dogfight on its first flight (or carry passengers on an airliner's first flight), you don't throw every possible complication at an ABM during the early test phases. The tests start pretty simple but they've added complexity all along, such as the recent test where an Aegis cruiser shot down a simulated cruise missile with an SM-2 and a ballistic missile with an SM-3 at the same time.

[Noclevername]

Actually, the US did some real world field testing in 2003 during the invasion of Iraq by successfully shooting down several short ranged missiles.


And missed some too. But a mass launch of ICBMs is the OP's implication, I think. Different animal, though of the same genus.

[Jeff Root]

Jeff - you are really mixing up cause and effect (and actually, failing
to recognize the independent motivation/action of the shooter).
Think about it. Think about it good and hard. You haven't, yet.


Being able to defend yourself is not provacative.
Think about it, DyerWolf. Put yourself in the other guy's place.


But it does make people think twice about attacking you.
Some people, in some situations, will think twice about attacking
someone dressed for battle who would never give a thought to
attacking the same person otherwise.

Do you think that there is even one single case in all of human
history in which a shooter changed his mind and decided not to
shoot because his target was armored? I doubt it. There are
unquestionably many cases where the shooter decided to wait
for a better opportunity because the target was armored, and
sometimes the delay prevented the shots from ever being fired,
but I suspect that nobody ever has decided not to shoot simply
because his target was armored. If he just has to shoot right
now, but you are armored, he'll shoot your wife and kids instead.
Later he'll come back with a bigger gun to finish you off.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis

[Halcyon Dayz]

The mean reason for the ABM treaty was that both the US and the USSR knew that neither of them would ever have allowed the other side to implement such a system.

It would have left the party without it indefensible from nuclear attack.
So trying to build one might very well have provoked the other side to launch a first strike attack.

[Noclevername]

Some people, in some situations, will think twice about attacking
someone dressed for battle who would never give a thought to
attacking the same person otherwise.

Some individuals, yes. Countries don't act like most individuals.

[Van Rijn]

It would have left the party without it indefensible from nuclear attack.
So trying to build one might very well have provoked the other side to launch a first strike attack.

Assuming a perfect defense was possible. The other side of the coin is that, during the cold war, missile accuracy kept improving, so that both sides were finding more elaborate ways to hide their missiles, and there was concern that it was potentially leading to launch on warning. I was very worried where another decade or so of a continuing cold war could take us, and it looked like a limited missile defense could help with the hair trigger reaction.

As for today, I would like some options other than a preemptive strike if North Korea or some other nation with nukes gets a bit irrational.

[Noclevername]

As for today, I would like some options other than a preemptive strike if North Korea or some other nation with nukes gets a bit irrational.

Specifically, some counntry with missile-delivered nukes. Anti-missile defenses are no use against a boat. And the number of countries (or groups other than countries) who could potentially have access to nuclear explosives and boats (or planes, trucks etc.) is far more than those with long-range ballistic missiles.

[Van Rijn]

Specifically, some counntry with missile-delivered nukes. Anti-missile defenses are no use against a boat.


No, you use other weapons to take out a boat. But we already have those.


And the number of countries (or groups other than countries) who could potentially have access to nuclear explosives and boats (or planes, trucks etc.) is far more than those with long-range ballistic missiles.

While such might be terrorist or revenge weapons, they don't make very good bargaining chips. And again, there are other means used to deal with them.

[Noclevername]

While such might be terrorist or revenge weapons, they don't make very good bargaining chips.

So? There are terrorists in the world, y'know. Including, I'm sure, some who would use nuclear bombs if they could get their hands on one and wouldn't even think about "bargaining". And if we can't even keep people from smuggling drugs or illegal aliens in, that means there's plenty of holes in the net for a nuke to slip through.

[Van Rijn]

So?


Because it is a different subject and not an argument against missile defense.

[Noclevername]

Because it is a different subject and not an argument against missile defense.

I wasn't arguing against it, just pointing out its limitations.

[Larry Jacks]

The mean reason for the ABM treaty was that both the US and the USSR knew that neither of them would ever have allowed the other side to implement such a system.

It would have left the party without it indefensible from nuclear attack.
So trying to build one might very well have provoked the other side to launch a first strike attack.

Actually, both the US and Soviet Union did build ABM systems in the 1970s. The ABM Treaty originally limited each country to two ABM sites but was later amended to build only one each. The US built ours in North Dakota to protect part of our ICBM fields. It was called Safeguard. The Soviet Union built theirs around Moscow. Reportedly, they believed there was no need to protect their missile silos because they'd be empty after being fired. The US activated our Safeguard system but deactivated it the next day. The Soviets kept theirs and it's still there.

Part of the goal of the ABM Treaty was to prevent another escalation of the arms race. If both sides built massive ABM systems, it was feared that they'd also build ever larger ICBM and SLBM arsenals to overwhelm the other side's defenses. With the single Safeguard site, the US choose to preserve enough of its ICBM inventory to maintain a credible deterrent while the Soviets choose to protect their capital and seat of power.

Today, no one is talking about a perfect defense against a massive attack. The goal is to have a defense against an accidental attack and to neutralize a marginal nuclear power such as what North Korea and Iran aspired to become. Demands of perfection against a massive attack are a strawman argument, as are pointing out the obvious that missile defense won't protect against WMD delivered by other means.

[ASEI]

Part of the goal of the ABM Treaty was to prevent another escalation of the arms race. If both sides built massive ABM systems, it was feared that they'd also build ever larger ICBM and SLBM arsenals to overwhelm the other side's defenses. With the single Safeguard site, the US choose to preserve enough of its ICBM inventory to maintain a credible deterrent while the Soviets choose to protect their capital and seat of power. Why was that escalation seen as bad from our perspective though? We would win in a production battle - the Soviets would have gone bankrupt and self-destructed just that much earlier. And we would be laughing at Kim Jon Il and Ahmadinijad (sp?) now when they threaten anyone with missiles.

[Noclevername]

Today, no one is talking about a perfect defense against a massive attack. The goal is to have a defense against an accidental attack and to neutralize a marginal nuclear power such as what North Korea and Iran aspired to become. Demands of perfection against a massive attack are a strawman argument, as are pointing out the obvious that missile defense won't protect against WMD delivered by other means.

Then why have those who propose such systems not made those points clear? I still hear ABM described as "preventing nuclear attack". It's not a straw man to argue against the only argument being presented.

[BigDon]

Then why have those who propose such systems not made those points clear? I still hear ABM described as "preventing nuclear attack". It's not a straw man to argue against the only argument being presented.

Preventing limited nuclear attack Clev.

[Noclevername]

Preventing limited nuclear attack Clev.

I haven't heard that term used, although I admit to massive indifference toward any talking-head media discussion you'd care to name. So I'm not up on all the lingo used in the standard cut-and-paste Talking Points exchange.

Meh. It's a tempest in a teaspoon anyway.

[metatron]

What has Russia worried most of all is the placement of the missile batteries.
They are extremely badly placed(Poland, Check republic) to respond to a missile launch from Iran, and won't be able to make a dent if Russia attacks. However are ideally situated for a massive nuclear first strike on Russia(i.e. mopping up whatever remains).
Also while it may be pathetic now, remember that it's just the groundwork. How capable will the system be in 10 or 20 years from now.

Remember, in military matters you always judge your (potential)enemies by CAPABILITIES, NOT stated intentions.

[What]

USA must have build and be hiding hundreds of ABM's if they are even serious about the missle shield program.

West of the western US coast, it's all pacific ocean. We got Hawaii and Alaska wherein to build missle defense shields - probably (most likely) some other islands too. Japan maybe allow us to build ABM shield. Now the USA owns territory up to and including islands hundreds of miles off the west coast - plenty of room and plenty of time to track shoot down a missle from that direction. California would or could be a second place to build AMB shields.East coast? Nothing. Only eastern US continental coast to build ABM's. Too dangerous too risky - too much room for error and too close to begin shooting down missles.. until your allies in Europe let you build shields there. I think to even begin to be effective, those ABM's need to be numerous and aligned hundreds of miles away east and west, and also on the continent. This is my presumption as for their location in Europe and why the Ruskies' underwear is tied in knots, since they don't have this ability...and that's my uneducated guess.

[Delvo]

Remember, you can put anti-missile missiles on boats/ships too... which the USA has been doing...

[Albert the Skeptic]

In the days of the two superpowers, the logical response to one of them possessing a 100% shield and being ready to activate is would be for the other to start bombing now, while he still can.

But Iran and N. Korea know that if they actually use their nukes, our response will be to vaporize Teheran or Pyongyang, which they cannot prevent. The whole idea is ludicrous.

By the way, the big problem with building a shield is all the computer programs and data that have to be foolproof. The British lost a destroyer to an Exocet missile in the Falklands war, although the ship could have put up a curtain of fire and shattered it . The defense system recognized the missile as being "friendly' (made in France) because the database didn't know the Argentines had bought some.

[Jeff Root]

Today, no one is talking about a perfect defense against
a massive attack. The goal is to have a defense against an
accidental attack and to neutralize a marginal nuclear power
such as what North Korea and Iran aspired to become. Demands
of perfection against a massive attack are a strawman argument,
as are pointing out the obvious that missile defense won't
protect against WMD delivered by other means.
I have never, ever heard anyone argue that a perfect defense was
either possible or a goal.

A missile defense opponent such as I states the obvious: Defense
systems cannot be perfect and could not prevent every missile
from reaching its target. A missile defense proponent responds
by saying that "no one is talking about a perfect defense against
a massive attack," which indicates that the proponent is either
missing the simple point being made or is deliberately tying to
change the subject away from that simple point by replacing it
with a strawman.

Soon after Ronald Reagan proposed a "nuclear defensive shield"
in October 1982, one of my first objections was the inability of
such a system to respond usefully to small-scale attacks coming
from unknown launch sites. The system was originally proposed
specifically as a "shield" against a massive missile attack by
the USSR. In that scenario, scores of missiles would be launched
in the space of a couple of minutes. That an attack was taking
place would quickly become obvious, and it would be obvious that
the defensive system should be activated.

After the collapse of the USSR, missile defense proponents needed
a new enemy target for their defensive weapons, so they started
talking about accidental launches and attacks by rogue states.

My argument is unchanged: Launch of one or a few missiles do not
present an obvious signature of an attack. If the launch is not
announced and not expected, it could take longer to determine
whether it is an attack than it takes the warhead to reach its
target. Therefore the system must be designed to launch against
anything that looks like it might be an attack. And since the
defensive weapon must be launched within about three minutes of
the attackng missile's launch, the decision-making process must
be entirely automatic. If it requires a human decision, it will
launch too late to do any good.

So the reason for pointing out that missile defense systems
cannot be perfect is that the imperfection means they create
more danger than they remove: They cannot prevent every warhead
from reaching its target in a massive attack; They are even less
capable of countering accidental or unexpected launches, and
especially launches from unexpected launch sites; They are almost
certain to be ineffective if launched on human command; They are
almost certain to either launch unintentionally or fail to launch
when needed if commanded automatically; And they promote the
delivery of nuclear weapons by means which are less technically
difficult, less expensive, require less development time and
effort, are more flexible, more reliable, and even harder to
intercept.

Really, really nasty. That's what a missile defense system would
be: Really, really nasty.

For everyone except the defense contractors, of course.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis

[RalofTyr]

It's not really a missile defense shield but a missile defense crap shoot. If the anti-ICBM missiles hit, well, that's lucky, if they don't, it's not really much a of a shield anyways.

[Maksutov]

It's not really a missile defense shield but a missile defense crap shoot....Correct, and one off of which certain cronies stand to make megabucks. At least until January 2009.Military/industrial/government complex: Hi, I'm here to sell you this water-proof shield that will protect you from rain.

Taxpayer: Sorry, your shield looks less like an umbrella, and more like a sieve.

[Jeff Root]

Since I mentioned one of my first objections after Ronald Reagan
proposed a "nuclear defensive shield" in October 1982, I'll add
what may have been my very first objection, raised within ten
minutes of the end of Reagan's TV monologue:

Reagan said in that monologue that (inexact quote) "For every
weapon ever invented, a defense against that weapon has been
invented." That is probably very close to being true, but the
converse of it is so close that it was even at that time a
long-established adage: A new weapon has been invented to
overcome every new defense, usually before the first time the
new defense was fully deployed. Reagan got the platitude
exactly backwards.

New weapons are virtually always far easier and quicker to
design, manufacture, and deploy than new defenses. Less
expensive, too.

-- Jeff, in Minneapolis

[DyerWolf]

Jeff, I'm not sure I understand your thesis.

Are you suggesting that merely because a defense can eventually be overcome, that the government should never spend money on defense?

If so, I can not agree with you.

Also, the taxpayer - expense thing is IMO a sham argument. Think of a defensive system protecting civilians as "infrastructure." History teaches us that government spending on infrastructure has always been beneficial to the economy. The money may be paid directly to a "defense" firm, but it then pays its suppliers, employees, taxes, etc., which all return money to the general economy.

New weapons are not always more easy to develop. The club, spear, sword, pike, halberd weapons category was easily matched by the shield & boiled leather, splint mail, plate mail defefensive category for thousands of years. Then some intrepid folks invented firearms, and it took several hundred years before Kevlar and ceramic came on the scene.

Modern defensive systems aimed at defeating or deflecting firearms and explosives are saving thousands of lives.

It makes sense to me to develop a defensive system that can save millions of civilians.

[Larry Jacks]

My argument is unchanged: Launch of one or a few missiles do not
present an obvious signature of an attack. If the launch is not
announced and not expected, it could take longer to determine
whether it is an attack than it takes the warhead to reach its
target. Therefore the system must be designed to launch against
anything that looks like it might be an attack. And since the
defensive weapon must be launched within about three minutes of
the attackng missile's launch, the decision-making process must
be entirely automatic. If it requires a human decision, it will
launch too late to do any good.

You fail to understand missile trajectories. An ICBM takes upwards of 30 minutes to make a long range flight. It's launch and azimuth can be detected very soon after ignition. If two or more satellites pick up the launch, you can determine a great deal about the trajectory even before it enters the coverage of a ground based radar (used for confirmation). Once the engines have burnt out (typically less than 5-6 minutes into the flight), they know with a high degree of certainty where the missile is heading. This is nothing new - the systems to do this have been operational for decades.

What is difficult is a short range missile or an SLBM on a depressed trajectory where the flight time is much shorter. However, those missiles can still be detected very quickly. The question is whether there is time to stop the attack. That depends on whether there are any indications and warnings (I&W) about hostility. If it is a terrorist attack like 9-11, there may not be much or any I&W before the attack. If it is a nation, there most likely will be some things that indicate an attack is likely, such as massing troops and equipment or relocation of senior personnel. The Intel Community is constantly monitoring for such indications. They're been motivated by the fear of another Pearl Harbor style attack (only with nuclear weapons) for almost 60 years.