Perhaps the Japanese made a plan to sneak attack Pearl Harbor and perhaps the plan worked. They tried the same thing at Midway and the only thing that foiled the plan was fooling them with a false message. That and the fact that, by Midway, we were at war and were expecting to be attacked. Pretty simple really.

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You're a coward and a liar and a thOOF - Bart Sibrel

Actually, the "AF is having trouble with its fresh water condenser" message was designed to convince skeptics in Washington--US cryptanalysts in Hawaii had already surmised that Midway was the target. And even with code-breaking, Midway was still a near-run thing.

__________________
--Doug

"When your statics problem becomes a dynamics problem, you're in trouble." --me

Moor's Law: "As you go from freshman engineering to Ph.D., the amount of work required per credit hour doubles approximately every 18 months." --me, inspired by Prof. Scott Moor

OOOOOOOOOhhhhhh yeah. Midway was one of the biggest and most pivotal turning points of any modern war. It's hard to find one battle with more at stake. You can't attribute victory to any one factor; it was complicated on many levels. Luck and minsfortune, poor judgement and good judgement, bravery and courage all landed on both sides of the battle, and we came out smiling. It was a miracle to only lose the USS Yorktown.

Codebreaking was a factor, but how much? Most or least important? Who knows? Military scholars can debate it from about twenty different angles.

About the best thing you can say for the codebreakers is that had it not been for the decrypted messages, we would have had a tougher time with the decision to "go for broke" at Midway and not "play it safe" by hanging out at Hawaii. Without the decrypts, I suppose we could have still followed the path of reckless glory and headed for Midway. But the decrypts played a major part in that decision. The decision to leave Hawaii unguarded wasn't taken lightly.

No naval conflict in WWII can better epitomize the cliche, "No guts, no glory!"

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My son is my universe.

Looking more in depth at Pearl Harbor, there are some points noted by several sources, even though they don't necessarily support the conspiracy.

The issues raised regard information that Washington received but did not relay to Pearl Harbor. Specifically, "Purple" deciphered messages, in which Kimmel and Short were not informed that spies were transmitting information from the Japanese consulate at Honolulu about the disposition of the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor.

The following messages have been documented....

Dated 24 September 1941, requesting reports of vessels in five sub-areas of Pearl Harbor, and requesting reports of warships and aircraft carriers at anchor and tied up at wharves, buoys and docks. Particular request was made for mention of the fact when there were two or more vessels alongside the same wharf (Army translation, October 9-Document 2, Exhibit 13).

The Japanese Consul at Honolulu established a code to refer to the location of vessels in particular areas (Navy translation, October 10-Document 3, Exhibit 13).

Tokyo on 18 November 1941 requested a report on vessels anchored in certain areas and it directed that the investigation be made with great secrecy (Army translation, December 2- Document 9, Exhibit 13).

A report was sent by Honolulu to Tokyo on 18 November 1941 setting forth the warships in the harbor in certain areas, commenting on the presence or absence of aircraft carriers, and describing in detail the course of certain destroyers which were observed entering the harbor (Army translation, December 6-Document 10, Exhibit 13).

On November 20th, Tokyo requested a comprehensive investigation of the Fleet bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation (Army translation, December 6-Document 7, Exhibit 13).

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/hewitt/hewitt-2.html

Why would the information from these messages not have been forwarded to Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor?

The so-called "Bomb Plot" message was discussed briefly earlier in this thread; for a detailed discussion, see the Joint Congressional Committee Report, pp. 182-190. Note that half of the Republican members of the committee signed the report, so it can in no way be characterized as a "whitewash."

A few high points:

From the same report:


They should have been, but they weren't for two reasons; first, no one who saw the messages appreciated their possible significance, for reasons detailed above; second, some senior officers mistakenly believed that Pearl Harbor had a Purple machine (in fact the one earmarked for Pearl Harbor had been given to the British, and through a bureaucratic foul-up no replacement was constructed). I will address this issue in a later post.

From the report's conclusion on this issue:
Note that failure to pass on this intelligence does not in and of itself exonerate Kimmel and Short of any blame for the disaster.

[edited for line breaks]

__________________
--Doug

"When your statics problem becomes a dynamics problem, you're in trouble." --me

Moor's Law: "As you go from freshman engineering to Ph.D., the amount of work required per credit hour doubles approximately every 18 months." --me, inspired by Prof. Scott Moor

I can think of at least two reasons that don't require any kind of conspiracy. One, already mentioned, is people failing to realize their significance. The second is the ever-popular answer of incompetence.

__________________
Gillian

"Now everyone was giving her that kind of look UFOlogists get when they suddenly say, 'Hey, if you shade your eyes you can see it is just a flock of geese after all.'"

"You can't erase icing."

"I can't believe it doesn't work! I found it on the internet, man!"

Personally, I don't think that anyone or any organization could maintain a conspiracy like this. It is too complicated. It fails the Occam's Razor test...

Another reason that hasn't been mentioned for not passing along the Purple intercepts was security. There was a certain paranoia in the intelligence community that if too many people were privy to the decrypts, the chance of Japan's catching on was increased and it became more likely that they would change their codes.

I seem to recall that at a certain point, the White House was excluded from the distribution list for Purple decrypts. It was considered to susceptible to leaks (accidental or deliberate).

Of course, this is a classic conundrum for the codebreaking community. It's not always easy to strike a balance such that everybody who needs the information gets it, but nobody who doesn't does.

(Heh. I like the way that last sentence ends...)

__________________
Relight the Firefly!

"It is quite clear that Occam's razor does not sharpen in your pyramid." (Nicolas)

"Still, a man hears what he wants to hear and disregards the rest." (Paul Simon)

However, it certainly adds weight to the argument that Kimmel and Short were hung out to dry as solely responsible. If all this information was deemed too insignificant to forward to Pearl, then why should Washington not have been (even to this day) properly blamed for this grievous error?

In 1942 the Roberts Commission pronounced Kimmel "derelict in his duty" and "solely responsible for the success of the Japanese attack."

..the DORN REPORT, which was seemingly accepted by the Department of Defense as definitive of DOD's conclusion's after an exhaustive review of the historical records and circumstances, reported that "Responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General Short; it should be broadly shared."

http://www.pacshiprev.com/page14.html

Endorsements for the vindication and advancement in rank for Kimmel and Short come from the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association, the Admiral Nimitz Foundation, the Naval Academy Alumni Association, the Retired Officers Association, and the Pearl Harbor Commemorative Commission.

http://www.aim.org/aim_report/A109_0_4_0_C/

A 1995 Department of Defense study concluded "Army and Navy officials in Washington were privy to intercepted Japanese diplomatic communications ... which provided crucial confirmation of the imminence of war.''

..on May 25, 1999, the U.S. Senate approved a resolution that Kimmel and Short had performed their duties "competently and professionally" and that our losses at Pearl Harbor were "not the result of dereliction of duty." "They were denied vital intelligence that was available in Washington," said Senator William V. Roth Jr. (R-Del.). Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) called Kimmel and Short "the two final victims of Pearl Harbor."

I find it shameful and very tragic that Kimmel and Short lived out the rest of their days as the "official" scapegoats for Pearl Harbor. It seems that FDR, Adm. Stark and Gen. Marshall, to name three, never were and still have not been assessed for their part in the disaster.

Most historians these days do assign blame to your aformentioned trio, however, their sins are usually sins of omission. Stark, in particular, as the 14 District commander had responsibility for the safety of the fleet in harbor. Henry Clausen has this to say about Roosevelt on the 6th and 7th.
However, to call Kimmel and Short "scapegoats" is to assume that they were blameless (that is after all what a scapegoat is) and this is far from the truth. They had warnings (perhaps inadequate) and were totally unprepared as the commanders on the scene to respond. Henry Clausen assigns them most of the blame. Regarding Short, whose job it was to protect the fleet, he says
So, yes, Roosevelt bears some of the blame. Should he have been removed from office, or Marshall? I think even you, turbonium, would admit that that would have been bad. Short and Kimmel were hardly blameless and to call them scapegoats is an exercise in propaganda. Even if exonerated, their removal from their positions was inevitable and, frankly, Nimitz was a far better CINCPAC than Kimmel could ever have aspired to be.

__________________
"I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind." - William Thompson, 1st Baron Lord Kelvin

"If it was so, it might be, and if it were so, it would be, but as it isn't, it ain't. That's logic!" - Tweedledee

This isn't right. This isn't even wrong. - Wolfgang Pauli

Stark was Chief of Naval Operations in Washington. ADM Bloch was commander of the 14th Naval District.

Bloch, not Kimmel, was Short's naval counterpart in Hawaii. He and Short were supposed to coordinate defensive measures. When the war warnings came, regardless of any intelligence, these men had the responsibility to conduct reconnaisance and patrols and to protect the ships in Pearl Harbor and other installations in the islands. This was explicit in their orders when they took command. They were given ships, planes, radars, AA guns and men to perform these explicit tasks, and they utterly failed to act either individually or in concert.

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"Transport of the mails, transport of the human voice, transport of flickering pictures - in this century, as in others, our highest accomplishments still have the single aim of bringing men together." St. Exupery

The Naval Court of Inquiry was the only investigating body where Admiral Kimmel was accorded all elements of due process; to wit, the right to counsel, the right to introduce testimony, the right to summon witnesses and the right to cross-examine witnesses. And the Naval Court completely exonerated Admiral Kimmel from fault. Consequently, the proceedings of the Naval Court of Inquiry should be accorded the greatest weight of all those bodies which placed Admiral Kimmel's performance under a microscope.

Admiral James O. Richardson wrote in his book "I do not assert that Kimmel was without blame for some of the Naval aspects of the Pearl Harbor debacle, but his blame was less than that of his superiors."

http://users.erols.com/nbeach/kimmel.html

I realy think Kimmel and Short got burned - the information kept from them, especially in the weeks up to Dec.7, 1941, was the key reason they were caught so unprepared. If they share any blame, it seems to me that it should be a fraction of that borne by their superiors.

Perhaps Kimmel, but not Short. Kimmel's area of authority was huge, and the intelligence he received indicated threats to the western Pacific, but nothing he had indicated Hawaii as a specific target.

Short and Bloch had no such excuse. Their job was to patrol, protect and defend Hawaii and the surrounding waters. When the war warnings came, it was their responsibility to consider all possible avenues of enemy attack on their areas of command and to take appropriate measures. As stated by a joint Army-Navy Board convened on Oahu in October, 1941:

Short & Bloch required no further orders from their superiors to act; they only had to do their job - and they didn't.

__________________
"Transport of the mails, transport of the human voice, transport of flickering pictures - in this century, as in others, our highest accomplishments still have the single aim of bringing men together." St. Exupery

Yea, my bad on this one. I knew Stark was CNO and was typing in a hurry.

Actually Stark was removed from office as a result of the attack and replace by King. Stark was re-assigned, however, and sent to Europe to command the naval forces there, and did a good enough job to get a ship named after him. Ironically, we all remember what happened to the Stark (FFG-31).

Count Zero mentions that Kimmel had access to intelligence Short did not. One of the strikes against Kimmel is that he never shared this info. Perhaps he felt that Bloch, as district commander had the responsibility, but in practice, Kimmel was Short's opposite number and apparently kept him in the dark.

And again, turbonium, yes there is blame to be assinged to Kimmel and Short's superiors in Washington. If not assessed at the time, it has been by historians. Regardless, Kimmel and Short were the on-scene commanders. It was their job to be prepared even if they received no info from DC. They were not prepared. They were not scapegoats.

__________________
"I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind." - William Thompson, 1st Baron Lord Kelvin

"If it was so, it might be, and if it were so, it would be, but as it isn't, it ain't. That's logic!" - Tweedledee

This isn't right. This isn't even wrong. - Wolfgang Pauli

The amount of weight added is minimal, because of Kimmel's and Short's obvious errors of judgment and failure to discharge their duties. It appears to me that Short was actually guilty of criminal neglect of duty, although he was never court-martialed. Also, for reasons detailed above, the failure to forward the intelligence was not a "grievous error." I suggest you read the entire text of the relevant portion of the Congressional report linked above. To recap,

I suggest reading the entire Dorn Report rather than going by one quote specifically chosen to boost a pro-Kimmel, pro-Short book.

From Part IV:

Members of military organizations tend to stick up for their comrades, and for their commanders. While this tendency is commendable, it also calls into question their objectivity in passing judgment on the actions of their fellows.

Which is why Kimmel and Short were sent messages in late November 1941 containing phrases such as "consider this dispatch a war warning," and "hostile [Japanese] action possible at any moment." Both CTs and Kimmel and Short supporters frequently attempt to transmute "Washington knew the Japanese were going to attack somewhere in the Pacific" to "Washington knew that Japan was going to attack Pearl Harbor."

This was attached to a bill with many other provisions--it in no way implies that every Senator studied the issue in detail and concluded that Kimmel and Short should be advanced on the retired list. Further, the evidence that Short did not carry out his duties "competently and professionally" is incontrovertible. His predecessor in Hawaii, General Charles Herron, prepared an extensive briefing book for Short to read on his voyage from California to Hawaii; Short read a novel instead. Short appointed Kendall Fielder, an officer with no intelligence training, to head his intelligence staff (G-2) against the express recommendation of Herron; available evidence indicates that Fielder was selected simply because he was a West Pointer who was polished and charming. Short rewrote his alert policy, reversing the numbering scheme (previously, Alert 1 had been the highest alert; Short changed it to the lowest alert) without notifying Washington of the change. Unfortunately, my copy of Clausen is on loan at the moment, so I can't give specific citations, but here is the affidavit of General Herron, from the report Clausen filed with the Secretary of War:

Herron felt that a Japanese carrier attack at dawn was a serious possibility. See here.

Herron also felt (correctly, as it turned out) that the threat from sabotage by the local Japanese population was minimal. In 1941 he was quoted in Look magazine as saying:

Short might or might not have accepted Herron's views on these matters; however, his failure to read the briefing materials or consult with his predecessor are prima facie evidence of neglect of duty.

The term "scapegoat" implies a lack of blame; clearly Kimmel and Short were blameworthy in this case.

I find it shameful and very tragic that Kimmel's and Short's families are in such deep denial about the admiral's and general's failures of judgment and duty, that they are still attempting to overturn official administrative findings of the Department of Defense, and giving ammunition to conspiracy theorists.

Stark was relieved as Chief of Naval Operations; he was, however, reassigned to an administrative position. (Note that had Short and Kimmel not chosen to attempt to force the issue by resigning, they likely would have eventually received such assignments).

As for Marshall, exactly what do you consider his "part" to be, and why do you think he hasn't been "assessed" for it? The Army Board found Marshall responsible--however, all three generals who served held grudges against the Chief of Staff; Stimson specifically declined to endorse this particular finding. The supplemental investigation by Henry Clausen proved that the key evidence against Marshall was false. (Short version--two officers claimed that they had delivered the 14-part message to Marshall the night before the attack; Clausen, an experienced prosecutor, got them to admit that they had not.)

When Short was first appointed Commander of the Hawaiian Department, Marshall advised him,
Also, as I detailed in an earlier post, Marshall attempted to send a last-minute warning to all Pacific commands, but his subordinates failed him.

Finally, Marshall accepted responsibility for Washington's failure to notice that Short had not gone to the proper state of alert, even though one of his subordinates had previously admitted to the mistake.

What failures do you feel FDR has not been held to account for?

PS--sorry for delay in replying; I've been out of town the past few days.

[edited for several quoting and url errors]

[edited for clarity]

__________________
--Doug

"When your statics problem becomes a dynamics problem, you're in trouble." --me

Moor's Law: "As you go from freshman engineering to Ph.D., the amount of work required per credit hour doubles approximately every 18 months." --me, inspired by Prof. Scott Moor

This is a favorite line of CTs and Kimmel-Short apologists. The reason that rules of criminal procedure were followed is that information developed from a court of inquiry may be used to prefer charges for subsequent courts-martial. This also applies (at least to some extent) to the Army Board, which exonerated Short.

The fact that their respective services felt, rightly or wrongly, that their errors did not rise to the level of criminal neglect of duty, does not absolve Kimmel and Short of responsibility for Pearl Harbor; neither does it demonstrate that they were unjustly removed from command. In addition to fears that courts-martial might compromise intelligence sources, Army leaders believed that if Short were convicted, and Kimmel were acquitted, that blame for Pearl Harbor would fall disproportionately upon the Army. The Navy had similar fears about a Kimmel conviction and a Short acquittal. Therefore, neither service was eager for either officer to be court-martialed, even though both had requested such, in order to "clear" their reputations.

Admiral Richardson had quite an axe to grind against FDR, as the two had quarreled over policy differences, and for that reason the President had relieved Richardson of his command a year early. He can hardly be considered an unbiased observer on this issue.

Could you please explain exactly what information you believe was kept from them (other than the "bomb plot" messages, which, as previously detailed, are subject to many different interpretations)?

Could you also please explain why you feel that, knowing as they did that the Japanese were expected to attack somewhere in the Pacific, Kimmel and Short were justified in not being on high alert against a possible air attack?

__________________
--Doug

"When your statics problem becomes a dynamics problem, you're in trouble." --me

Moor's Law: "As you go from freshman engineering to Ph.D., the amount of work required per credit hour doubles approximately every 18 months." --me, inspired by Prof. Scott Moor

It might have something to do with a few thousand miles of ocean between them and Japan. Plus there was no declaration of war between our countrys only rumors and opinions. Plus carrier warfare was new and not something they would have concidered as a threat to an entire island and an entire fleet.

Sure is nice to have all the facts and none of the responsibility after the fact. It makes it so much easier to point fingers and assign blame. Sure they probably thought there would be a war at some point. But when, in a week, a month, a year?. Were they to stay on this 'high alert against possible air attack' forever? Burn out the troops so that if an attack does come they won't be in any condition to fight? Who's to say that Japan wouldn't attack Wake first or Midway. Why not the Philipines? Why would they come 4000 miles past all of that and attack the whole fleet?

Sure now it seems obvious. Yamamoto's plan was brilliant. That's why it worked and that's why I don't hold anybody at fault other than the Japanese navy. We're just lucky that they didn't launch the third wave as that might have really finished us off for a long time..

__________________
You're a coward and a liar and a thOOF - Bart Sibrel

No. The Japanese were known to have aircraft carriers with the range to reach Hawaii; the Navy had conducted mock carrier raids on Pearl Harbor during maneuvers, and Marshall had advised Short that air attack was a serious threat.

No. Kimmel and Short had been warned by their superiors that war was likely, and the Japanese had a history of attacking with little or no warning.

No. Hawaii was given nearly 200 fighter aircraft, and several scarce radar sets. There were no Japanese bases from which land-based bombers could reach Pearl Harbor. What were these fighters and radars to be used for, if not protection against carrier raids? Also, as mentioned above, the Navy had wargamed carrier attacks during maneuvers.

Among the facts: Kimmel and Short both failed to carry out their orders (to cooperate on defensive measures, and to share intelligence, to name just two). Also, Kimmel and Short were the commanders on the scene; the ultimate responsibility was theirs.

To be frank, comments such as this make me wonder how serious you are about discussing the issue. It appears that you are not interested in critically evaluating the evidence; rather, you seem determined to make Kimmel and Short out to be martyrs by belittling the evidence against them and oversimplifying the issues.

The following warnings were sent to Kimmel and Short by the Navy and War departments, respectively.


Straw man. Most of the fleet was away from Pearl Harbor a significant portion of the time conducting training. Army air defenses should have been on highest alert whenever the fleet was in port. Also, dawn and dusk were known to be likely times for an attack; the state of alert could have been relaxed somewhat in the middle of the day. Further, a certain level of alert can be maintained indefinitely (such as 16 fighters airborne and all AA batteries manned at dawn and dusk, and 8 fighters airborne and half of all AA batteries manned during the middle of the day).

All Pacific commands were ordered to be on the alert--the fact that an attack on Hawaii was considered unlikely is no excuse for the lack of preparedness of American forces, particularly the Army.

Because the US Pacific fleet was far and away the most valuable target in the Pacifc, and the greatest threat to Japanese plans.

The Japanese plan was brilliant, but it was also a gamble. The reason the gamble paid off so handsomely was that American forces were so unprepared.

This is debatable; the Japanese would have suffered many more aircraft losses in their next attack, as the defenses were fully alerted. Also, the US was already preparing mobile forward base units for the expected war; one of those could have been moved to Pearl Harbor to replace damaged repair and fuel facilities, if necessary.

__________________
--Doug

"When your statics problem becomes a dynamics problem, you're in trouble." --me

Moor's Law: "As you go from freshman engineering to Ph.D., the amount of work required per credit hour doubles approximately every 18 months." --me, inspired by Prof. Scott Moor

As for being on alert, Britain was on full invasion alert for many months on end, it was expected at any momentBeing on alert doesn't mean every man in a foxhole all the time.

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Exactly, they didn't say anything about Pearl Harbor because nobody concidered it likely.


I'm sure if Kimmel and Short had it to do over they would have done it differently too. [cliche']Hindsight is 20/20.[/cliche']

Remember prewar, the military was under strength and underfunded. Those 16 planes flying around all day would have been seen as a waste of resources and they would have started wearing out pretty fast.

At anyrate, I agree that Kimmel and Short did deserve some of the blame but there's plenty of blame to go around and those guys shouldn't have been held accountable as the only ones to blame IMO so if you're not going to hold everybody accountable then don't hold anybody accountable. Just clean the blood and get on with the war. It was a political thing.

__________________
You're a coward and a liar and a thOOF - Bart Sibrel

As Secretary Stimson wrote, the fact that an attack is expected elsewhere does not excuse a sentry for a lack of vigilance. Short was told that his first priority was to protect the fleet and its base; in this he failed.

True, but irrelevant.

In your zeal to portray Kimmel and Short as scapegoats, you have made a highly illogical statement. Pilots have to fly a certain number of hours a month in order to maintain their skills, and aircraft that never fly are more difficult to maintain (as they are designed to be flown from time to time). Are you an expert on aircraft maintenance? If so, please state your qualifications. Furthermore, your answer appears to presume that the same 16 aircraft would be flown every day (in fact, probably two squadrons of 18 aircraft each would have been required daily for the job; eight were available, not counting the Navy and Marine fighter squadrons).

During her ten-day mission to ferry Marine fighters to Wake Island, the USS Enterprise maintained a continuous daylight CAP of four to six Wildcat fighters, with only one 21-plane squadron aboard. Even discounting the additional complication of carrier operations, each Army squadron would have had to exert about one third the effort (4-8 fighters airborne every fourth day) of Enterprise's VF-6.

As previously discussed, Admiral Stark was relieved as Chief of Naval Operations in part for his role in the Pearl Harbor disaster. General Martin, the commander of the Hawaiian Air Force, was also transferred, though he received a comparable command as his next assignment. To quote from the Dorn report:

No. See above. Also see the quote from the Dorn Report in my previous post.

__________________
--Doug

"When your statics problem becomes a dynamics problem, you're in trouble." --me

Moor's Law: "As you go from freshman engineering to Ph.D., the amount of work required per credit hour doubles approximately every 18 months." --me, inspired by Prof. Scott Moor

One thing to add to all of this. Kimmel was not demoted. His permanent rank was Rear Admiral (2-star). He held full Admiral rank (4-star) only as long as he was assigned to a position commensurate with that rank. When he was relieved as CINCPAC/CINCUS he was no longer in a 4-star billet, and reverted to his permanent rank of 2-star Rear Admiral.

Now normally an officer would be retired at a rank (and pay) that correlated to his highest assigned rank. As a result of his role in the Pearl Harbor calamaty Kimmel was retired as a Rear Admiral, not as an Admiral. That's one of the things his descendents and defenders are trying to reverse. Not that I think they have a case. In my time working with the U.S. Navy (my day job is as a consultant to them, I've spent more time at sea on the "Grey Funnel Line" than most civilians) I've seen several excellent officers removed from command and retired at a lower rank because of an accident or damage their ship incurred while they were in command. A classic example are the officers of the Stark. Several of them received medals for their role in keeping the ship afloat after the attack at the same time they were being court martialed and removed from their position for dereliction of duty for letting the attack occur in the first place.

__________________
"I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind." - William Thompson, 1st Baron Lord Kelvin

"If it was so, it might be, and if it were so, it would be, but as it isn't, it ain't. That's logic!" - Tweedledee

This isn't right. This isn't even wrong. - Wolfgang Pauli

Pilots do indeed have to maintain a set amount of hours in the air but that is nowhere near the hours needed for 24 hours coverage of the area surrounding Hawaii. They would have been flown out as would the aircraft. I don't know how they were fixed for spare parts but based on other branches at the time, I'm guessing they didn't have a large stock of stores laying around to keep the planes in the air around the clock. They probably could have done more but again, for how long? It's not irrelevant when you're assigning blame to someone for a debacle of this magnitude.

You don't just fly planes until something breaks, fix it and fly it again. There are time checks, inspections and time changes for parts. Engines for example, have a limited life before they are pulled and sent to the shop for overhaul (T.B.O). Probably something like 50-100 hours. You'd need enough spare engines to replace them or the plane is grounded. And that's just one componant. If you must know, I've been an aircraft mechanic for 20 years but my experience really doesn't apply to pre-WWII military planes.

At any rate our disagreement is only over how much blame Kimmel and Short deserved. I say a fraction of the blame is theirs. You say more, so be it. Ultimately it was them who were responsible but I think of them as the last line of defense. They relyed too much on the higher ups to provide real time intelligence and the higher ups relyed on Kimmel and Short make up for their lack of support. It's always the guy at the bottom left holding the bag. You're okay with that, I'm not. Doesn't really matter what we think anyway. Besides, as Eta C points out, it's not like they were sent to prison.

__________________
You're a coward and a liar and a thOOF - Bart Sibrel

This happened recently to the commanders of the USS Greeneville and the USS San Francisco, after those submarines were involved in fatal accidents. Again quoting from the Dorn Report:

__________________
--Doug

"When your statics problem becomes a dynamics problem, you're in trouble." --me

Moor's Law: "As you go from freshman engineering to Ph.D., the amount of work required per credit hour doubles approximately every 18 months." --me, inspired by Prof. Scott Moor

24 hours would not be necessary--the Japanese could not have made an effective attack at night.

Even assuming that they maintained this alert continuously, the number of flight hours would not have been excessive. Rounding off to 12 hours of daylight for convenience, 16 fighters airborne for two hours after dawn and two hours before dusk is 64 flight hours; eight fighters airborne for the eight hours in between is another 64 flight hours. This is 128 flight hours a day, times 30 days, is about 3800 flight hours a month. This is about 20 hours a month per plane (and about 20 hours a month per pilot); hardly an excessive amount. However, as I mentioned (and you have ignored), this alert could have been relaxed somewhat when the fleet was away, which was the majority of the time.

You have shown no calculations or other data to back up your assertions--you merely assume this to be the case for some reason. Again, you appear to have the idea that I have proposed that all USAAF fighters should have been airborne at all times.

Even if you think that a 16/8 combat air patrol is too expensive, why not an 8/4, or even a 4/4? The point is, there was no CAP airborne, and there should have been.


Again, there were nearly 200 fighters available at Pearl Harbor. I'm talking about flying about 30 of them for a few hours each day. You seem to have the idea that this would have consumed some vast amount of resources over and above what was required for routine training flights.

I feel that you are greatly oversimplifying. You really should read the entire Dorn Report; it's not that long. Even if you don't agree with the conclusions, you could learn a lot about the issues involved, which are rather complex.

__________________
--Doug

"When your statics problem becomes a dynamics problem, you're in trouble." --me

Moor's Law: "As you go from freshman engineering to Ph.D., the amount of work required per credit hour doubles approximately every 18 months." --me, inspired by Prof. Scott Moor

You are forgetting RADAR. there were sets available.
RAF Fighter command didn't need to keep a perm CAP in the air they had warning, they just had pilots and aircraft ready on the ground. OK a couple of sets aren't going to give the coverage of the Chain Home system but they do reduce the size of the CAP you need.

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I aways find the US's attitude toward radar at the time of the attack confusing. The British had demonstrated just how effective it could be in 1940. Yet in late 1941 the American military, and especially the Hawaiian forces, seemed to treat it as a gadget whose utility was dubious. The only reason that a radar set was in use the morning of the 7th was that the operators had been doing training overnight and they kept operating the system since the truck that was to pick them up was late. Even then, the operations center that could have acted on this was not manned.

It's examples like this that further point out the unpreparedness of the forces in Hawaii, Short's Army forces especially. He had warning that something was likely to happen. Even if he felt that an attack on his base was unlikely he should have had the radar stations and op center manned and operating and pilots by their aircraft on alert status. Instead, aside from lining up the airplanes to avoid sabatoge, they were in a 1930's era peacetime training mindset.

This is not just hindsight. They had the framework for such a system in place. The forces, and especially their commanding general, simply did not take it seriously.

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"I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind." - William Thompson, 1st Baron Lord Kelvin

"If it was so, it might be, and if it were so, it would be, but as it isn't, it ain't. That's logic!" - Tweedledee

This isn't right. This isn't even wrong. - Wolfgang Pauli

Eta C, I have a question not directly related to Pearl Harbor but nevertheless interesting regarding the US Military's attitude towards British Tactics in those days

During the German U Boat Campaign in the Atlantic ("Operation Drumbeat") I have read (in the same book that claims that during the BoB, the RAF had major problems with the lack of pilots, which from what I have seen it's not accurate, so please don't shoot me Cap'n Swoop ) that it seems that Admiral King wasn't too keen on the British Tactics (like using Convoys, Direct communications between Air Force patrols and Navy Command in case a sub was spotted and so on) so he did not enforce them until it was shown that Operation Drumbeat was being very succesful. In view of that he of course adopted those tactics and managed to stop the U boat threat.

So in short my question is twofold:

a) Since I have not found much info on it, did this attitude exist in some of the brass at the US Navy in the early days of its involvment in WWII?

b) Was this attitude towards British Tactics normal in the USN at the time? (I realize that Admiral King became Chief of Naval Operations AFTER Pearl Harbor though)

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Sic Transit Gloria Mundi

Sigma_Orionis,

It's an interesting question. Some of the conventional wisdom of King and his attitude about convoying seems to come from personality clashes. King was definitely an Anglophobe and usually suspicious of British motives. He did not get along with his counterpart, First Sea Lord Dudly Pound. For his part, Pound seems to have regarded King as focused on the Pacific as well as somewhat incompetent. King, for his part, found Pound overbearing and arrogant and displaying a "we'll show you beginners how to fight" attitude.

That being said, King was alive to the need for convoys. A good reference is Clay Blair's 2-volume set Hitler's U-Boat War. It's somewhat revisionist (in that Blair feels that the U-boats never came close to choking off Britain despite statements at the time and by other historians since) and has a bit of a US bias. Still, it's well researched and Blair has stats to back up his claims. In the first volume on pp 455-457 he deals with the "King opposed convoys" myth. He contends that King was well alive to the need for convoys. He was, after all, CINCLANTFLT before becoming CNO. As such he was responsible for the US escorts assigned to convoys through most of 1940. A couple of excerpts.

He cites a memo from King sent three weeks before Pearl Harbor.

Part of the problem was a lack of escorts, and King did not want to send convoys out unescorted. Part of it was quibbling about who would command, British or Americans. Some was also due to King's preference to escort and covoy troopships at the cost of leaving some cargo merchants and convoys unescorted. Anyway, I'll do some more reading on this one and get back to you.

__________________
"I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind." - William Thompson, 1st Baron Lord Kelvin

"If it was so, it might be, and if it were so, it would be, but as it isn't, it ain't. That's logic!" - Tweedledee

This isn't right. This isn't even wrong. - Wolfgang Pauli

Thanks Eta C, I will look on my own as well

I didn't know that King and Pound were at odds. I did know that King was not too crazy about the British though

Hmmm, Bail's Hitler U-Boat War might just be the next book on WWII i'll buy, thanks for the reference!

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Sic Transit Gloria Mundi