If we cannot get a handle on this "absolute mind independent reality," then, it means it has no consistent, detectable effect on us. We don't have to worry about it. We are free to form and take advantage of multiple, overlapping, and competing theories. We should feel fortunate that there is more than one way to skin a cat, so to speak, and that many of those ways work adequately well.

Notice that engineers don't seem to be as discouraged by the lack of access to some posited absolute certainty. They function quite well with a toolbox full of useful techniques. Any new method that helps them get a project in on time, under cost, and satisfactory to the customer is seen as a benefit. Scientific types, on the other hand, seem to see such developments as falling short of the mark.

Len, be careful not to let philosophy misguide you into losing sight of what is truly of value to you and your life.

Kaptain K,

String Theory
Why do you think m-theorists might get lucky? Is that your definition of the scientific method? Does anyone else support Kaptain K's view?

The rapid advances in other fields of science such as biology was not due to luck, rather it was due to biologists preforming a set of specific experiments that were used to develop a fundamental base for biology. Biologists are not positing 12 dimensional space.

There is no fundamental base in physics. Physics has a set of contradicting curve fitting black box models.

Why is developing m-theories science? How many dimension in the real physical universe? 13? 20? How are banes different than Maxwell's model for which space had wheels and small balls in it?

What is a dimension? Note the string dimensions are not observable. After 20 years m-theorists have not develop a single testable “theory”. Why do you believe m-theory is different the alchemy? Compare "theoretical" physics to biology.

Comments:
The fact that a hundred thousand papers per year are and can be written in the field of m-theory (string theory), indicates that there is no possibility of closure using the “infinite number of monkeys” developing an infinite number of mathematical models methodology. The problem is not just that the "infinite monkey methodology", "no bounds on the model methodogy" will not solve the fundamental problems of physics (i.e. The fundamental problems are not even identified), but rather that intelligent people in physics, astrophysics, other fields do not criticize the methodology and its result (i.e. A hundred thousand papers per year with no convergence or connection with observation.)

Compare the number of m-theory models 100^503 to the number of hydrogen atoms in the universe. There are roughly 4x10^79 hydrogen atoms in the observable Universe.

I agree, except that such a stance throws into question the degree to which we think our models match the absolute. You quite often hear comments that suggest our models are asymptote in nature - they continually approach the absolute but never reach it, but if we have no conception of what mind independent reality is then we have no means in which to ever make a scientific judgement as to how close or distant our models are, the judgement is philosophical in nature. But if we accept this distinction between what is scientific thought and what is philosophical thought in terms of models and their relationship to the absolute, I think we would all be much clearer about what science can and cannot achieve, and clearer regarding the relationship between science and philosophy.

Yes, I have often compared the methodology of engineering to that of physics, but does this mean physics is just engineering? I don't think so, because the models that physics teases out and constructs from our interaction with mind independent reality are discoveries about that interaction and hidden in those models are elements of the absolute. This is what Bernard d'Espagnat ("on Physics and Philosophy") says:

Experiments at the quantum level involve predicted observations at the measurement device, the idea that a "particle" is localized independently of our knowledge is not assumed - the notion of an observer (which is the same as the measurement device) becomes an essential ingredient of the experiment rather than an option (such as watching or not watching a stone being thrown). So the experimental nature of quantum mechanics points to an underlying reality that is mind independent and hence scientifically inaccessible (though I must mention that Ken G considers this notion can be discerned clearly at the classical level, not just at the quantum level). For me, to ignore the implications of what physics is telling us is to instill a false sense of what physics can achieve. But if the implications are faced, then what we are left with is physics as a discipline that explores our relationship with mind independent reality in terms of models that are human representations rather than providing an illusory asymptote journey to the absolute. And that human representation is where the proper scientific methodology (as I understand it) ends. But hidden within those models is the absolute and whilst we scientifically cannot extract that absolute, philosophically, the pointers that d'Espagnat talks about may at least provide some kind of link to it.

Thanks for the advice! But my real interest is simply knowing what the scientific methodology can and cannot tell us about the world. If I can get a handle on that, then notions of the absolute fall into their proper place and the picture that science gives of the world becomes so much more meaningful.

Consider that the problem may be with the "models match reality" notion philosophy imposes on us and not with science itself.

We understand what it means for a photograph of a person to match that person. If an athlete runs the 100-meters in the same time the world record holder did, we say that his performance matches the record holder's. But when philosophers say that the model does not match absolute reality, it is not clear what is meant by "model" and what is meant by "absolute reality," and most importantly, how one establishes a correspondence relation between the two such that one can talk coherently about models matching reality or asymptotically approaching reality.

It seems science is being held to an ill-defined standard. My concern is that in doing so, we lose sight of the value of science in our lives.
Look around you. Science has drastically altered the way we live our lives. We landed on the moon six times with classical mechanics. That is not asymptotically approaching reality. That's living within reality and taking advantage of what it affords.

Now, true, no matter how well we are doing now, we can always do better in the future. But that is not a matter of moving closer to some mind-independent reality. It is a refinement and improvement of technique. It is like the way a golfer improves his putt. Persistent study and practice increases his putting success. He does not move towards some singular, perfect Platonic Ideal putt. The objective is to get the ball in the hole and there are numerous ways to accomplish that. Course conditions are always changing too. Adaptability and flexibility is an advantage.

All human pursuits fall under the umbrella of living a happy of a life as is possible. We strive to do well and live with as much joy as we can attain.
We do use the terms "practical" and "theoretical" differently, but that doesn't mean that "theoretical" is somehow distinct and separate from our lives. Nor is the theoretical pursuit holier than the practical. Practical and theoretical are just different techniques for improving our lives. They are different means of accomplishing an end. We can test our racecars on the track and in a wind tunnel. Or we can pursue the same end through a CFD analysis on a computer cluster. Both the practical and the theoretical approaches are embodied in the same human undertaking of producing a faster car. They are two different ways of skinning the same cat.

Be careful with your assumptions here. Perhaps the problem is not with scientific accessibility, but with the philosophic notion of a "mind independent reality" or an "underlying reality" or an "underlying mechanism" and so on. It seems to me to that for us humans, no matter how much we directly see and experience in the world, we for some reason disqualify what we see in front of us and attribute the "real truth" to some posited hidden underlying mechanism or reality. We see the same attitude in those who pursue the occult, conspiracy theories, and religion.

Look at your quote from d'Espagnat:

Is he describing the work of a scientist or of a priest?

Going back to the engineering aspect, notice that philosophers and scientists think they are somehow isolated from the real reality. Engineers, on the other hand, live with the concern that their actions will have real consequences. They see reality as having a hand on their throats ready to squeeze if they don't act the right way--or at least ready to slap them upside the head.

We engage in a process of studying the world, experimenting, developing techniques, employing those techniques, measuring their success in our lives, and returning to the first step to for another loop through the cycle for refinement. We are not asymptotically isolated from the world; we are embodied in it. Discovery is not a matter of revealing a literal "underlying reality," "underlying mechanism," or "absolute truth," but of improving our lives.

Joe

I'm not entirely sure, but you seem to be putting forward views of a very holistic nature that would rule out any kind of mind independent absolute as existing independently of us. Certainly the experimental outcomes at the quantum level could point to this scenario, the essential notion of the observer/measuring device fits into this kind of complete holistic system. The interpretations that we take from quantum measurement involve facing up to the fact that at the most fundamental level we cannot invoke a separation between subject and object - the notion of an observer/measuring device is a requirement. I take from it a notion of mind independent reality as existing "out there" (I would prefer to call it an interpretation rather than an assumption). But none of this stops us doing science very successfully in terms of models by invoking an artificial separation of subject and object, but it does focus attention on what we think science can tell us about the underlying nature that this artificial separation takes place in (regardless of how one interprets this underlying nature, be it an interaction by us with mind independent reality or just one complete whole). My only real point in all of this is to clarify where scientific enquiry ends and philosophical enquiry begins in terms of discussing these questions - if indeed one thinks they are worth discussing. I do think they are worth discussing because I am interested in what the boundaries of science are since much of theoretical physics seems to think it can move in a direction that will uncover the underlying nature of the physical world as an entity independent of us.

William,
You said:

HA!
Fleming damn near threw out the contaminated petri dish that had all the dead bacteria in it! Thus, penicillin was discovered. Serendipity runs rampant through all fields of science!

__________________
Any day you wake up on "the right side of the dirt" is a good day.

T. Anderson

In reply to Kaptain K.'s comment:
One cannot use the fact that penicillin has discovered serendipitously in 1928 to conclude that developing m-theory models which have a 13 dimensional space that contain branes or strings or some other theoretical mathematical entity (there are 100^503 possible models) is science and is different than alchemy.

As I noted biology has continued to advance, theoretical physics as others have noted has not. There have been no Nobel prizes awarded for “m-theory”.

You did not answer my question. Is m-theory akin to alchemy?

I field where theories multiply without constraint is a field in crisis. The “theoretical” physics theories are closer to fantasy than science fiction.

Comment:
The discovery of high temperature super conductivity is an example of a physics discovery that was made using the Edison method of trail and error, based on a hutch, by Karl Müller and Johannes Bednorz.

From Wikipedia

Classical Newtonian mechanics could explain the motions of the planets in broad terms, but it could not explain in full detail (the error was small) the precession of Mercury's orbit. Along came relativity, which can easily account for Mercury's precession.

I would say that the theory which explains the most observations is objectively better than the one which explains fewer observations. Does this make it closer to reality? Not necessarily, in principle: it could be that the ultimate reality is completely different from what we observe. But in practice I would say we generally assume that there is an intimate connection between our sensory data and reality, and that therefore a theory which explains more observations is closer to reality. And by "we" I don't just mean scientists -- all human beings reason in this way about most things in their lives. Which is quite sensible, because at the end of the day it's the sensory input we have to deal with, not the inaccessible ultimate reality. At least in this world.

__________________
"A witty saying proves nothing" Voltaire.
"All your bias are belong to us" Ara Pacis.

Yes, I entirely agree, it is the sensory input from this world we deal with and that is our macroscopic reality. In terms of that reality, I can certainly consider theories getting closer and closer to what we observe empirically.

Where I run into doubts is the way physics deals with empirical observations but then introduces notions that can never be observed. Those notions seem to gain an element of macroscopic reality by many (perhaps they don't for most scientists - I'm not sure) that for me is unjustified. I can happily accept these notions when thought of as purely a model to accommodate macroscopic observation, but if we can never observe these notions, we can never say that they are close to or quite different to our reality. We can't say anything about them other than they are purely a model that is a human representation of the absolute (in what ever way you may interpret this "absolute").

The passage of photons from a source to sink is especially problematic I think. The source and sink are macroscopic in the manner you describe - they are part of our observable reality and the results we take note of are part of that reality. But the bit in between we can never observe so we construct a model based on a time difference between activation of the source and the detection of a signal and that model we call the propagation of light at a speed c. What happens in between can never be thought of as being close to or distant from our macroscopic world because we can never observe photons in flight. But I don't see this as a problem as long as we think of this model as being a human representation of the absolute (and again, I have no idea what this absolute is other than just calling it "something" that is inaccessible).

But for me this issue seems to come in to focus at the quantum level. Experiments at the quantum level involve predicted observations at the measurement device, the idea that a "particle" is localized independently of our knowledge is not assumed - the notion of an observer (which is the same as the measurement device) becomes an essential ingredient of the experiment rather than an option (such as watching or not watching a stone being thrown). So at this level we are forced to acknowledge that entities as particle events (the movement of one particle from point A to B) are not part of our macroscopic world - we construct models based on predictive observations, not events. The events are models that can never be observed, but that does not reduce their value as scientific truths because we make practical use of them. But again they are human representations of the absolute (what ever that is).

The lessons from quantum experiments tell us that the world at this level requires the notion of an observer/measurement device, we cannot talk about events as happening without this notion, and even then, those events are not seen, the predictive observations are seen. So we can take an interpretation from this - the underlying reality of our world that can exist without our presence is nowhere to be seen or accessed. Our models of particle events can never be compared in any manner to our macroscopic reality as being "true", nor can they be thought of as existing independently of observation/measurement. All we can say is that they are human representations of an absolute that we can never access. But the form this absolute would take can only be a philosophical interpretation, I think of it as an entity that is "out there" as something existing entirely independent of us. Some think of it as not being "something" out there but rather we are all part of a complete whole, everything is just "everything" if you see what I mean.

But the important point (for me) is nothing to do with how one interprets the absolute, the important point for me is where does science end and where does philosophy start when dealing with these questions. For me, science ends abruptly at the models that are human representations of the absolute, it can offer no authority over the nature of the absolute or how close models are to it with any greater degree than philosophical enquiry. But I don't say that in any negative manner in terms of what physics can achieve or will achieve in the future, it just redefines (for me) the role of physics in a much more satisfactory manner.

A crucial part, yes.
Right, it seems it relates to "how closely you look", or the difference between an effective understanding and "the truth". When Greek philosophers, like Zeno, looked too closely at the classical models and tried to interpret their ramifications if they were "true", they ran into many of the same problems we encounter in quantum mechanics. The key difference seems to be that in quantum mechanics, the problems are harder to avoid, you pretty much have to confront them, whereas classically you get away with pretending they are not there.

Right, that's the key, we built science to do certain things, and it does not compromise the effort to recognize that-- it informs the effort.

Yes, that's well said.

We do all right-- for a bunch of smart apes.

Everything is a projection. When we look at our surroundings, it would be insensitive to those who are blind to bemoan the limitations of using light as our probe; instead we revel at having sight. I think the ability to do science is just like that.

And any other insights we can get, even those that are not scientific. We just don't expect the latter to be testable-- they are just up to us. But that's an important part of freedom-- as long as it doesn't hurt anyone else or lower our value to the society (if we take it to the point of delusion).

I'll be more willing to entertain this idea once computers learn to dream.

__________________
If they can get you asking the wrong questions, they don't have to worry about the answers.

That's right. To be clear, I am not saying that “there is no reality;” we are fully immersed in it. Reality is not going to let us off that easy, hiding, always just out of reach. We talk about “models” representing “absolute reality,” but that is mostly just a metaphor. The product of science is no more a model or representation of some supposed absolute as is one of our golfer's putts a model of some supposed absolute putt.

I was thinking about your earlier question if science was just engineering. We may think of fundamental science as pure, abstract research, but consider that science creates some of the largest engineering projects ever including the LHC, the Apollo program, large telescopes, expansive antenna farms, and so on. We cannot seriously take the LHC as producing a mere model of some underlying absolute truth. We could say that the LHC scientists are not making a model of reality, but learning how to operate and make use of a very large contraption.

As for separating subject from object, you would need to define both terms and then define what it means to separate the two. Some people simply mean that an experiment is reproducible by others. But since you have to produce all those definitions, you could just as well dispense with the whole subject/object dichotomy and say what you want to say.

You might want to start with questioning the assumptions and methods philosophy has handed you such as dividing everything into an “in here” and an “out there” and making you work within the constraint that the “in here” is a copy or model of the “out there.”

Both Newtonian mechanics and quantum mechanics succeed even though neither provides nor depends on an underlying mechanism. The success of Newtonian mechanics is not being in the passive possession of some model that represents some underlying nature, but of flying to the moon and back and so on.

The bogey of underlying mechanism overly bewitches us.

That's coming from a non-physicist perspective, perhaps a behavioralist. However, most physicists do indeed think that their art, physics, creates models of reality. A better analogy, then, would be that a computer program designed to figure out what stroke is needed to sink a putt would indeed be modeling an "absolute" putt, meaning a real putt. Others might say this is one of the primary purposes of science.

__________________
Logic is the grammar of truth.

Meaning and absolute certainty are incompatible, and profound meaning and absolute certainty are profoundly incompatible.

The only thing intelligence is capable of is recognizing itself.

Another interesting and IMO relevant story by John Timmer at The Register:

Poll:US taxpayers want more funding for scientific research, John Timmer, The Register, July 02, 2008 - 07:45PM CT

__________________
Chris Hillman

Read these PF posts. Avoid Wikipedia--- except for these versions. Read this and this suggested sticky. When asked for advice, I always say: never take advice!

Perhaps its more the perspective of an anthropologist. I am looking at the physical artifacts and activities of scientists, as well as the way the world and people's lives change, and asking, “What is taking place here?” There are models, metaphors, analogies, and representations, here, but is the best description of the products of science is that it produces copies of the world it studies? It is not clear in such a case how being in possession of a replica of something makes one knowledgeable about the original. Owning a cheap knockoff of the original Rubik's cube wouldn't help one in solving the original cube.

The computer does produce representations, of course. Perhaps it displays a 3D animation showing the golfer how to position his body and swing. But in the bigger picture, the computer is embedded in the same physical context the golfer is. The golfer improves his stroke by responding appropriately to feedback. The computer becomes part of the overall loop involving the golfer and the golf course. The computer functions as part of the feedback loop. Overall, then, the computer's function is not to model, but to increase control sensitivity to particular features in the environment.

I think that the LHC and the like perform the same function for physicists. The LHC puts them in command and control of the environment in ways they could not be otherwise.

From my vantage point I was asking where science ends and philosophy starts when dealing with questions of the absolute, whereas from your vantage point there is no such question to ask - all we have is our reality, and notions of that reality in the absence of our involvement, are artificial in nature. So in that sense your stance allows a clear cut answer to my question and it certainly does remove the need for dividing everything into "in here" and "out there", - everything is everything, in all senses from the microscopic to the macroscopic.

Such a strong holistic viewpoint simplifies many questions but I do find it very unsatisfactory, it seems to place restrictions on questions we can legitimately ask about our involvement (or non involvement) with nature, and even though such questions fall outside of of science they are at least questions that attempt to grapple with and admit to some kind of distinction between our reality and a reality that has no requirement to involve us.

Here is an example, recently discussed in the forum, which to me makes it transparent that physicists do indeed build and talk about models in their attempts to understand reality.

I'm not quite sure what would be the alternative interpretation, anyway, Joe. Do you believe that every scientific theory is ipso facto reality itself? Or are you suggesting that there is no difference between a fact and a theory?

__________________
"A witty saying proves nothing" Voltaire.
"All your bias are belong to us" Ara Pacis.

Fair enough, as long as you recognize what you are doing. The problem is when you make claims about what others (i.e., physicists) are, or are not, doing (i.e., not making models). I find that claim highly unsubstantiated, to say the least.
Why did you feel the need to replace the perfectly satisfactory word "models" with the highly incorrect word "copies"? If you did it to make your objection sound more reasonable, it would be prevarication.

That's simple reasoning from analogy, and a horrendous one at that. In actual physics, "owning cheap knockoffs" of actual physical situations is of tremendous value, we do it all the time, and is pretty much the core pursuit of entire subfields like astronomy. Look up "cosmological principle", for example, for a perfect example of the extreme value of a "cheap knockoff".

Precisely.

If I program a robot to strike a golf ball using the stroke calculated by a computer simulation, I hardly see how there is some "overall loop" that I need to take into account. No, we have a simple model of the interactions of a club, a ball, and a green, and we use that model to calculate what stroke should sink the putt. This is a model, pure and simple. If it works, the putt goes in. Why you insist in complicating that is beyond me. What possible benefit can be derived from seeing this as part of some elaborate feedback loop involving golfers and experiences? Why not include the golfer's family, upbringing, political views, and religion-- surely they all affect the putt.

You see, your position boils down to saying "a model is useless because it doesn't include all that", but the fact is, that's exactly why a model is useful. Which brings us right back to the importance in physics of the concepts of objectivity and mind-independent reality. Your views on behavior are not only not physics, they are pretty close to the opposite of physics.

And it achieves that by.... ? (Modeling.)
Indeed it does, and we extract that value by using models.

__________________
Logic is the grammar of truth.

Meaning and absolute certainty are incompatible, and profound meaning and absolute certainty are profoundly incompatible.

The only thing intelligence is capable of is recognizing itself.

I don't think it's very accurate to think of the LHC as something that scientists devised so that they could control their environment. It was built above all to let nature speak for itself, and answer some questions that physicists have been asking about it. Now, why would scientists have questions to ask about nature, if all they need to do to understand it is manipulate it?

__________________
"A witty saying proves nothing" Voltaire.
"All your bias are belong to us" Ara Pacis.

Mark Chu-Carroll, who works at Google, comments at his blog:

So far, pretty much what we've all being saying. But he adds that Andersen has badly misunderstood what has made Google so successful:

Edit: and from Sean Carroll, we have this blog post

__________________
Chris Hillman

Read these PF posts. Avoid Wikipedia--- except for these versions. Read this and this suggested sticky. When asked for advice, I always say: never take advice!

I'm trying to widen the viewpoint here to set the activities and products of science in a larger, more dynamic context--hence, the comparison to a golfer working to master putting on a particular green.

The phrase "difference between fact and theory" is another way of saying that our actions do not or will not always work out. There are any of a number of reasons for why we fail. It is not always a simple case of us being in possession of a literal model that happens to not correspond to reality. The model/reality comparison is mostly a handy metaphor we use to illustrate our failures and potential for improvement.

Getting back to the OP a bit, the Wired article suggests that knowledge can be gained without discovering "underlying mechanism" and the like. Others counter that a real explanation and understanding requires an underlying mechanism. I disagree. I think that from the get-go, we learn to take advantage of the behavior we observe. We learn to drive a car by learning how the steering wheel, gas pedal, brake, etc. control the vehicle. Mastering such visible, on-the-surface behaviors of the car is genuine knowledge. When we do get around to opening the hood to observe the "underlying mechanism," we are not learning in a new way as if there was something special or closer-to-reality about the engine. We are observing and taking advantage of aspects of the car that we haven't attended to before.

I'm cautioning against this notion that the hidden or the underlying has a higher (or holier) epistemological status than the initially observable. This, I think, is easier to see when you set aside the notion that Newton produced a model and instead appreciate that he showed us a new way of dealing with the world. You make a few observations of a comet. You wait six months. You perform some calculations. You position your telescope according to the calculations. You look in the eyepiece and see the comet. That sort of mastery of the environment is what Newton produced. It is very real. True, it is not always perfect. Maybe you don't do as well with the planet Mercury. There is room for improvement in some circumstances.

As for your black hole model, yes, we say that science produces models and we will continue to say that it does. But strictly speaking, and such speaking matters only in philosophical discussions like these, science has nothing in its hands that behaves like a black hole (but is not a black hole--only a model of one). It has recipes, techniques, and procedures for making observations, talking about them, making use of them, and so on.

So, I don't think the Wired article is showing us a new way of doing science. I think science has always been done that way. Again, Newtonian and quantum mechanics succeed, yet they provide no underlying mechanism. That will always be the case because explanations have to stop somewhere.

One cannot explain the complex search results by decomposing them into lower-level components. The explanatory link from the complex to the simpler is non-existent or not always well defined with emergent or dynamical systems. I think Anderson's point is that one does not need to in this case. Google does have to understand elements of the problem, but not the entire problem, to produce a useful system.

Because many people talk about models being more or less faithful to some underlying absolute reality. That suggests a notion of the model being an inferior copy of the thing modeled.

Thanks for the pointer. From Wikipedia: The Cosmological Principle is a principle invoked in cosmology that, when applied, severely restricts the large variety of possible cosmological theories. It follows from the observation of the Universe on a large scale, and states that: On large spatial scales, the Universe is homogeneous and isotropic. Or simply put, the universe is the same everywhere on a large scale.

I read that as a rule to allow only certain kinds of theories and to exclude others that don't qualify. In stating and applying such a rule we don't literally create some sort of universe that is the same everywhere, one that may or may not correspond to the genuine article.

Think of what you would do if on the first trial the robot overshot the hole. You might remeasure and tweak the system to zero in on a good putt. If you did manage to get it right on the first try, then it means you already acquired all the relevant control values earlier or by other means and knew how you had to make use of them.

You are describing a system that is sensitive and responsive to those aspects of the environment--the club, the ball, the green, and the golfer or golf-robot--that are required to sink the putt. Perhaps you, the programmer had to measure and enter the data. You become part of the loop then.

What constitutes the model here? Is it the robot itself as it sits idle? Is it the robot in the act of taking the shot? Is it the program and data residing in flash memory? Is it the program and data bytes being munched on by the CPU? Even the operating system code? And for whatever your answer is, how is it that it is a model of a golf putt (and say, not a model of something else)?

Perhaps the robot is built with a neural network or networks instead of a traditional computer system and was repetitively trained to sink putts (which amounts to the system self-adjusting weights and perhaps other variables among the neurons). There is no model of a green, a club, or a putt inherent in the system. Rather training pretty much wires it to efficiently produce particular sorts of responses to particular sorts of inputs.

Watch golfers prepare for a putt. There is a lot of observation and care. Up until the shot they may glance back and forth at the hole and at the ball. Practice has made them into a physical being, head-to-toe, that is sensitive and responsive to the characteristics of the course, the ball, the club, and their bodies.

Well, some athletes do consult with a psychologist to get themselves as ready as possible, but let's just consider the hundreds or thousands of hours repetitive practice and drills, of keeping at it until it is done well.

Yes, models can be subsets of what they model. But we can also simplify our tasks by focusing on the relevant to the task at hand. The child learning to catch a ball is taught to "keep his eye on the ball." He doesn't need to construct and consult a model of ball flight. He learns to point his eyes at the ball. When we carry out a task using Newtonian mechanics, perhaps calculating the trajectory of a ball, we attend to limited features of the environment. We make a few measurements and then proceed.

Not necessarily. Any means that guides the golfer to making better putts is fair game. The computer system has to provide an error signal of sorts that the golfer uses to adjust his putt.

I could incorporate your position into my thinking better if I understood in what ways scientific theories are models and how being in possession of a model is useful. Surely there must be clear-cut examples of models and a way to show that theories fall under the same category. Keep in mind that I fully understand why we liken the achievements of science to being in possession of models that probably are not fully faithful to what they model. Such notions are handy, but, in my opinion, can be safely set aside for philosophical discussions.

I do find it surprising that I seem to be the only one here arguing that science keeps us in fuller contact with the world than we would have without it. Others seem to be suggesting that the elaborate theories of science have an isolating or insulating effect, that a theory is a sort of barrier to some sort of absolute truth that is said to be lying beyond it.

Let me answer this more directly and less long-windedly:

1. I interpret the discussion on the referenced page as individuals speculating about actual black holes.

2. You, I take it, interpret the discussion as individuals accurately and non-speculatively describing a model of a black hole that may or may not fully correspond to actual black holes.

Has anyone here discussing models (especially putting models) ever actually played a round of golf? If you haven't I recommend doing so. The case of an inanimate object generating humility.

__________________
If they can get you asking the wrong questions, they don't have to worry about the answers.

There are several mainstream descriptions of black holes based on general relativity: the Schwarschild model, the Kerr model, the Reissner-Nordström model... Which one of them is the true black hole, according to you?

But I guess that example I gave might have been a bit obscure. So, here's another example of a model in physics that is clearly just a model: quasiparticles.

__________________
"A witty saying proves nothing" Voltaire.
"All your bias are belong to us" Ara Pacis.

The use of the term model is an acknowledgment that our knowledge of the actual is not complete and thus must always be representative of something out of reach (temporarily or permanently), so models can never be fully faithful to what they actually model, for then we would know the actual. If we choose not to define our scientific truths as models, then they become states of practical knowledge rather in the manner in which we practice engineering - EM radiation can be though of propagating electric and magnetic waves and we design an antenna as if the electric wave was a real physical entity. It's good engineering, but it is clearly a model representing a much deeper underlying reality. As soon as we acknowledge that fact we have created a distinction between what we observe and what that observation actually relates to. At a stroke the "state of practical knowledge" that could be thought of as having no representational value now becomes a model that is a human representation of absolute reality.

The role of science surely is to acknowledge the model as an objective human representation, to acknowledge the limits of science and to pursue the reality as best as we are able to. That pursuit has revealed a notion of unreachable absolute reality, but I don't see this as insulating us from nature, I see it as very much defining our place within nature.

No, it just doesn't. An inferior copy is like a poor musical recording of a live performance. A model of music would be something totally unlike either. I'm sure some efforts have been made to "model" music, and I'm sure that many composers have benefited from their consideration, but I suspect that a lot of the creation of music is still in a form that is quite poorly modeled. That is no surprise, science is not intended to be all things to all people-- yet it is intended to use models, and must understand why a model is not an "inferior copy".

Obviously. Why do you persist in claiming that models "create universes"? That's utter nonsense. The rule is a way of limiting the models we need to consider, not a way of limiting the universes we need to consider. There's only one of the latter, so far as we know.

Yes, I might build a better model. There is no issue that the creation of a model involves feedback, and trial and error, and humans, and what the humans ate that day, and their childhood influences, etc. None of that is in the least bit relevant to the issue of what a model is, and how they can be used to get a robot that can sink putts. We all know that doing science is a process, and it involves the human mind. What we are trying to understand is how that process relies on models, and what models are. You are seriously confusing that question by consistently mistaking them for something else, as if they claimed to be something else.

But again that's all quite obvious, and irrelevant to the issue of what a model is. You are describing the behavior of a person creating a model. Shall we be surprised that such a description would sound like something behavioral? Hardly. Your argument would be like trying to understand a mathematical theorem (perhaps the recently claimed proof of the Riemann conjecture), by studying the process by which a person becomes a mathematician. I think one is better served by learning math.


You're kidding, right? In truth, we begin making models when we are little babies. You have only to look at your own life to see what models are, and how they are used in science. In physics, the process is formalized, because models are generally quantitative, but their main purpose is to make predictions and to unify observations-- just like the little baby.

Um, yes, there are clear-cut examples of models. How about the model "Mommy" in the mind of a baby, for example? A baby sees a face that responds to crying by supplying crucial sustenance and comfort, and builds a model that there is some kind of entity there (who knows how a baby conceives of their model, we don't recall) that if they are within earshot, can supply these needs. The baby uses that model to make the prediction that when he/she cries, he/she will have the need met. This is a very useful prediction, even though of course the baby has not the least idea of what a "mother" really is, nor does their model of such resemble terribly closely yours or my present idea of what a "mother" is. I'd say this is a pretty clear-cut example of a model, we just formalize these in physics by making them mathematical and quantitative, because that is part of our goal-- a baby has less need for that.
To do so would be to set aside virtually everything that science is, and therefore have nothing left at all to talk about but philosophy.
I hardly see that as an "either/or" proposition. Science does keep us in fuller contact with the world, and it also has an insulating effect, because it requires one to function. Does not a famous surgeon save lives, and can he/she not also be insulated from the lives that they save? Why do you see a contradiction there?

__________________
Logic is the grammar of truth.

Meaning and absolute certainty are incompatible, and profound meaning and absolute certainty are profoundly incompatible.

The only thing intelligence is capable of is recognizing itself.

I have indeed, and your point is well taken. No matter how wonderful we may ever think we are, a small dimpled ball can always set us straight on the matter.

And although I would agree with the truth of that, I think it does not go far enough-- it tends to support the misconception that models somehow fail us by not being the actual. What fails us is our intelligence; the models serve us (notwithstanding my signature). The point of a model is to simplify, because we don't want the actual, we want something we can understand. That's the whole point of the exercise (which is why Occam's Razor is not a minor element of science, it is the core of science).
That is so, and indeed imagine a child asking three famous scientists and engineers "what is light"? One might answer, EM radiation, another might say, particles of various energies obeying quantum mechanics, and another might say elementary excitations of a field with a certain mathematical structure. None of those answers sound anything alike, yet all are "correct models"-- when applicable. The model is tailored to the need-- reality is not.

Yes, I think it can be both-- we have to accept some limitations to achieve the desired results.

__________________
Logic is the grammar of truth.

Meaning and absolute certainty are incompatible, and profound meaning and absolute certainty are profoundly incompatible.

The only thing intelligence is capable of is recognizing itself.