I am directing this question to Phil Plait (TBA) because he spent close to a decade working in the Hubble organization and with NASA people. Anybody else with similar contact with NASA, feel free to chime in here.

Does this article have the ring of truth? The way I read it (divide by 2, take the square root and throw out the remainder) it makes the top NASA admin people sound like The Three Stooges.

Of all the bad, lousy, wrong headed bosses I've had in my career, none of them had such poor decission making skills as these folks seem to have. :roll: #-o

Do the NASA top brass really use the Three Stooges system of decision making?!!!

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It's just one of those damn things of which there are many few. -- Dan Blocker

The article makes some good points, but it also glosses over the effort involved in a shuttle rescue mission. Yes, maybe you could have a module in the rescue shuttle that made a spacewalk unnecessary, but there's still the need either to prepare the rescue shuttle in a hurry or to have it ready to launch on short notice, just in case. Both situations would be unprecedented in the shuttle era.

I think it's clear that O'Keefe didn't want to have any shuttle missions in addition to the ones NASA absolutely has to commit to in order to finish the ISS. Safety is just the easiest excuse.

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Everything I need to know I learned through Googling.

Hey! Did I "ToSeek" ToSeek? Naw, dat aint posbull.

Actually, To Seek, what bugged me about this article is, it seems that the NASA top brass made a decision with no substantial basis. They then lied about what they had done, then rationalized it on political grounds. I most certainly hope they don't make other, human space flight decisions like they did this one.

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It's just one of those damn things of which there are many few. -- Dan Blocker

If I may chime in - I might add from a sort-of outside viewpoint, that O'Keefe seriously miscalculated both the public perception of Hubble as a valuable national asset (with a very strong sense of ownership not limited to the NASA and ESA members), and the political savvy of the astronomical community. Which is especially ironic given how much NASA has, under previous administrators, not minded at all cultivating such a community to help keep projects going when things looked bad on Capital Hill.

Henry Spencer (to whom an argument from authority would apply if it were ever appropriate) remarked a year ago on one of the sci.space newsgroups that the safety card was the one gold-plated way to kill Hubble. Sure, it might be technically possible to mount servicing mission 4 (yes, 4 - there were both a 3A and 3B), but astronomical missions are notorious for longevity, so if he didn't nip it in the bud we'd be back for SM 5 (for which plans were in fact already circulating), and who knows what else. But if SM4 were allowed to proceed, that excuse would be unavailable for further visits, and you'd have to get bogged down in budgetary arguments. (Speculation suppressed on whether HST was in fact the first sacrificial victim for VSE).

(Not TBA, but often thought to be a PBA).

Edit to add: My current viewpoint may be expressed with a loose paraphrase of Dr. Suess:
HOP on Pop.
HOP on Atlas.
HOP on Delta IV Heavy.
HOP in Ariane V.
HOP on Proton.
HOP on extra-large slingshot...

The best thing to do with Hubble is to leave it alone. I figured from the start that this robotic repair nonsense was bravo sierra. This thing was going to be a de-orbit package from the very beginning and and the findings that a shuttle-mission was needed to PROPERLY SERVICE hubble was just enough of an embarassment and gave O'Grief the excuse he needed to axe it.

That bean counter really needs to go. No wonder Saban left LSU.

This is what I would suggest. Spend money that would go to a Hubble de-orbit and put it into shuttle-derived Heavy-Lift studies.

Hubble will live out its useful life in orbit--and it comes down where it comes down.

When we have a SDV based HLLV, we can launch this:

http://www.tsgc.utexas.edu/archive/design/foci/

Or 80 ton LEO scopes of REAL power.

I guess I flubbed my original post. What I am concerned about is not WHAT was decided but HOW it was decided. Per the linked article:

1) We did all of this deep, meaningful research. (Not True)
2) We did all of this deep, meaningful evaluation. (Not True)
3) We made an informed decision. (Not True)
4) We wrote a deep, menaingful report. (Not True)

Is the article accurate? True? Are decisions at NASA typically made this way? Was this decision made this way? Is that Unusual?

I don't mean to stray from my signature philosophy but...if I made my engineering decisions this way, people would die on a regular basis.

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It's just one of those damn things of which there are many few. -- Dan Blocker

Got a musical score to go with that heavy lift song and dance routine?

O'Keefe was following the lead from the White House, particularly in light of Bush's interest, real or otherwise, in a Moon/Mars initiative following the Columbia disaster. Given the cost overruns on the station and the unreliability of the shuttle, he seized the opportunity and killed what he thought would be a white elephant that would mire us in low orbit trying to justify the ungodly bill for it.

As for the Hubble, it was the best system we could put in space with the tech we had at the time. Contrary to your very repetitive statements, bigger isn't always better. Cost/benefit determines how much goes into how big a satellite ends up and there's more to how much you get out of a satellite than how much you cram in it. You think servicing Hubble is a pain now? Try imagining servicing something in orbit several times as large. As the old engineer says, the more complicated they make the plumbing, the easier it is to stop up the drain. You don't build big just because you can build big, you build effective and its as big as it needs to be.

That's a pretty irresponsible attitude to have about a multiton piece of equipment that could conceivably survive re-entry, and you want to loft 70 ton satellites? Yeesh.

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I'm not completely heartless, the doctor who removed it told me he'd never be able to get it all.

O'Keefe's statement that "A stand alone mission ... is limited to certainly not more than 17 to 20 days" is not correct.

His point is for a thermal protection problem (like Columbia), a stand alone (Hubble) mission couldn't survive long enough for a rescue. That is not correct.

Atlantis and Endeavor are both capable of 28 day (nominal) missions with a 7-man crew, not including contingencies. This requires the EDO (Extended Duration Orbiter) pallet to provide more consumables.

Now, sufficient EDO pallets might not exist, or the orbiter plumbing might need tweaking, but that's different from "can't be done".

For a Hubble mission it's possible in a contingency to stretch consumables to 35-40 days, if not more. Why?

You'd only fly with two EDO pallets, giving a nominal 28 day capability, and only use a 4 man crew to reduce environmental consumption.
You know almost immediately upon reaching orbit if any damage happened. If damaged, you'd immediately power down everything (like Apollo 13) and stretch consumables.

Placing so much emphasis on thermal protection problems, need for ISS space haven, etc. is just an excuse. By far the greatest risk is ascent (engines, flight dynamics, etc) NOT a thermal protection problem on reentry. Both ISS and stand alone missions have the same ascent risks.

That is a very interesting story, and I don't see it until friday afternoon when the East Coast has already gone home for supper.

I will look into this next week for sure. I have seen my share of weird news the past few weeks, and I want to find out what's going on.

Thanks Phil. I look forward to your evaluation.

To All Who Have Posted So Far: I am not interested in the technical merrits of the decision, (keep it up/let it fall) one way or the other. My concern here is HOW the decision was made. As I see it, if the writer of the article is correct, the decision making process was abyssmal. They could well have come to the same decision using well founded techniques. In my line of work, people would get fired, if not prosecuted, for making decisions that way, even if it was the right decision.

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It's just one of those damn things of which there are many few. -- Dan Blocker

The guy who wrote the article linked in the OP, Robert Zimmerman, will be on Coast to Coast AM Sunday night, March 6. This should be interesting.

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Phil Plait
The Bad Astronomer
http://www.badastronomy.com
badastro@badastronomy.com

Bump. Show's on in a few minutes.

Seems that the guest won't be on in the first hour. Art is taking phone calls now.

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Any day you wake up on "the right side of the dirt" is a good day.

T. Anderson

They should send the guys from the station out on the Soyuz to do the job.

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Freedom For Fission A breath of fresh Iodine-131

You've got to be able to grab the Hubble and hold it in place. Only the shuttle is equipped for that.

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Everything I need to know I learned through Googling.

How the decision was made? Pretty obvious isn't it...

After the Columbia crash O'Keefe had to visit 7 families and tell the news.
Remember, he wasn't just the messenger. Ultimately he is responsible for the death of 7 people. I think at that moment he came to the conclusion that this was once and NEVER again. If he could, he would have canceled all shuttle/ISS flights but being an international project, this was beyond his powers. So he did the next best thing. He cancelled all 'stand-alone' flights and planned to leave NASA before shuttle flights to the ISS would resume. It was his decision, based on emotions. Who can blame him?

The current situation is also pretty clear. We know the costs, we know the risks (2% or so). Just find a new administrator who is willing to take that risk. It will be a long and difficult search...

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Following that logic, anyone responsible for deaths in the line of duty (military, airline presidents, etc.) should decide not to wage war, fly passengers, etc?

of course there's a responsibility to make things right so it doesn't happen again, but cancelling shuttle flights out of hand isn't the reason why O'Keefe made his decision. I happen to think he's made the wrong decision, but I also know that he made it based on many factors, not just "ultimate responsiblity."

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Starry, starry night...

My site TheSpacewriter.com
and my blog: TheSpaceWriter's Ramblings

Hubble slips away

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Everything I need to know I learned through Googling.

Its more than that. You have to find an American population able to stomach the reality of death in the line of duty. Most Americans these days wet their pants at the idea of risking their lives, to say nothing of the actual act thereof. Its so bad that people can't stand the idea of someone else risking their life. You have to cater to these cowards in order to secure funding, so the bottom line is that you have to operate with absolutely minimal risk, or the ability to conceal that risk from the American public, its a crapshoot either way.

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I'm not completely heartless, the doctor who removed it told me he'd never be able to get it all.